The spoken word and the barbed wire: Oral chiefdoms versus literate bureaucracies by Hofmeyr, Isabel
U N I V E R S I T Y OF THE WITWATERSRAND
A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW 7003 (7th floor) at
4.00p.m. MONDAY 2ND MARCH 1992




The Spoken Word and the Barbed Wire: Oral Chicfdoms versus Literate Bureaucracies
In 1923 the Native Commissioner of Potgietersrus, who was involved in an ongoing feud
with Chief Alfred Masibi of Zcbediela, wrote to his adversary. "I do not as a rule," he
said, "take verbal messages - you must get your secretary to write when transacting
government business."1 A few years later a new chief, Abel Kekana, took office, but in
no time the Native Commissioner was at loggerheads with him too. In May 1929 the
Native Commissioner wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs complaining about
Kckana's behaviour.
Adverting to my minute No. 2/1 of the 19th ult., and with reference to your No.
27/55 of the 6th inst. in connection with the conduct of the above named chief, I
have the honour to submit [a] copy of my letter evenly numbered of the Sth inst.
addressed to this chief calling upon him for an explanation as directed by you. To
this letter no response was received other than an intimation that he was busy with
his circumcision school and would attend to the matter later. On the 16th inst. I
attended the Local Council meeting at Zebediela, and there saw the young chief to
whom I at once intimated that I was not there to receive his explanation which he
could either submit in writing or personally at my office at Potgietcrsrust. Further
that if I received no response to my letter within seven days of the last mentioned
date I would submit the matter for further action by you without his explanation.
On the 21st inst. attended by his usual satellites who are mainly responsible
for his misguided conduct, he presented himself at this Office. He appeared to be
very sullen and on the questions contained in my letter of the 8th inst., being put
to him he gave his explanation, which I took down in writing and a copy of which
I attach hereto. His attitude was not at all reassuring, and in the interest of the
Tribe I do urge that he be severely dealt with....I have seen letters addressed to
members of the Royal family urging that this "oung man be deposed, but an open
expression of their feelings [is] stifled by tradition and sentiment.
However I submit a confidential report sent to me by W.S. Kekana which
clearly reflects the true position....2
As the letter makes clear, the conflict between the Native Commissioner and the two
chiefs was conducted through a variety of media and modes of communication: letters,
both public and confidential, public meetings, private appointments, verbal messages,
secret reports, and speeches copied down in writing. From other letters it is clear that
telegrams and telephones were also mobilized in the dispute.3 It is also clear that the
opposing sides attempted to rely on different kinds of communicative strategies to
maximize their advantage. The Commissioner generally wanted things in writing or
favoured face-to-face situations where he was in charge. Chief Abel Kekana, on the other
hand, avoided contact with the Commissioner where possible. But when forced to deal
with him the chief engineered an oral interaction while accompanied by his retinue who
evidently exercised a somewhat unsettling effect on the Commissioner.
Both sides, then, tried to determine the form and medium of interaction, and while the
two parties had access to oral and literate resources, both, in a situation of conflict, tended
to turn to the mode with which they were most familiar. Consequently, in this situation
of interaction between ruler and ruled, both parties presumably felt there was some
political edge to be had from insisting on a particular mode of communication.
This brief sketch of a spat between the chief and Native Commissioner raises a host of
questions about the relationship between forms of communication and political
authority. There is, however, one issue that emerges particularly clearly and that is the
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extent to which the forms of communication are a focus of political struggle. This
question of struggle is important to stress since there have been other studies that assume
that those with authority can unilaterally dictate the forms and modes of communication
between factions possessing unequal power.11 However, as Fabian in his analysis of
language and colonial power reminds us, we should always consider "simultaneously local,
creative response to communicative needs and restrictive intervention from above
motivated by a resolve to control communication...."*
It is such a bipartite analysis that this paper aims to implement in order to consider some
of the political dimensions of how orality and literacy interact. The general context for
this paper will be aspects of the interaction between the Native Commissioner's office and
the chiefdom. In order to consider the first part of Pabian's equation, we turn to analyze
how the chiefdom and its officials responded to and transformed the communicative
procedures with which they were confronted. The material used in this analysis is the
correspondence that passed between the Commissioner's office and Valtyn as well as
other surrounding chiefdoms.
In this correspondence, written roughly between the 1920s and '50s, we can observe
various ways in which agents of the chief attempted to bend the language of official
correspondence and bureaucracy to meet their particular needs. In transforming this
language, it was, of course, on pre-existing forms of discourse, knowledge and
understanding that correspondents drew. While it is often difficult to specify exactly what
such pre-existing forms might have been, there is one consistent theme that emerges and
that is an attempt to 'oralize' the written word and make it bear the 'imprint' of the
human voices and relationships that necessitated its creation in the first place. Such
'oralizing' can be seen in things like an insistence on oral messenger and oral memory;
as well as an attempt to subordinate literacy as the medium of ruling to institutions of
public assembly, face-to-face government, and personal audience. While there may well
be a number of ways to interpret these insistences, this paper construes them as part of
the cultural resistance of a community against colonial domination. As in its
confrontation with a literate religion, the oral pf*"rormance politics of the chiefdom
challenged the literate institutions of colonial bureaucracy by attempting to 'oralize'
them.6
As regards the second emphasis in our analysis - what Fabian terms "the restrictive
intervention from above" - we turn to consider the Native Commissioner's response to
the chiefdom, but on a level far removed from the bureaucratic letter. Instead, our focus
will be on a much more overt form of restriction - the fence - or as it was more popularly
known, 'the wire'. The fence may, of course, appear unconnected to issues of
communication and literacy. However, in so far as literacy and writing provide an
important set of vocabularies, idioms and images that can be transferred to other areas
of life, and can, for example, be used as an implicit justification of political domination,
fencing - which is often imagined as a type of demarcation or 'writing' that fixes white
authority in the countryside - can legitimately be considered within this ambit.7
In its drive to contain and control the chiefdom, the Native Commissioner's office did,
of course, also use quotidian literacy as a more modest means of control, particularly as
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far as issues of protocol and administrative procedure went. However, while these played
a subtle part in the control of the chiefdom, it was, in the long run, more coercive
measures that contained the residents of Valtyn. One of these was the fence and in the
second half of this paper, we examine this political 'literacy' in more detail.
In an analysis of the Native Affairs Department during the intcr-war years, Dubow
illustrates the ideological and administrative shifts that it underwent. Heavily influenced
by the Transkeian model of native administration, the post-Union Department followed
a policy of gradualist assimilation but subsequently moved to a more rigid doctrine of
segrcgationism. Administratively, the Department initially relied on ideals of government
through decentralized paternalism and "personal rule". This form of administration was,
however, soon supplanted by a much more centralized, purposive bureaucracy.8
This shift from local paternalism to centralized bureaucracy probably happened more in
theory than in practice. In remote areas like the Northern Transvaal, the Native Affairs
Department could never properly institute the full exercise of depersonalized and distant
control that a centralized, literate bureaucracy implies. The areas to be controlled were
simply too huge, the people in these areas too numerous and too unwilling to be
governed. Under these conditions, depersonalized, distant ruling can never take off and
instead, Native Commissioners had to rule through a combination of personal audience,
public meeting and oral messenger, or, in other words, the cornerstones of oral
government.9
In this situation, as Sansom has shown, the Native Commissioner's authority - which
was in theory extensive - depended on constant negotiation through which the governed
gained a measure of autonomy and freedom.10 The Commissioner's office, with its risible
staff complement and miserable police contingent '_. d to tread carefully and could not
rile its subjects too deeply."
In this context of contested authority, the conventions of ruling and protocols of
interaction become an important focus of struggle. One such form of interaction was the
letter which passed frequently between the chief and the Commissioner. Mostly
concerned with the details of licensing and permits for churches, schools and stores, these
letters probably formed the major form of communication between the chief and the
Commissioner who otherwise only encountered each other for meetings every three
months. In between there could, of course, be ad hoc gatherings, emergency visits and
circuit tours, but since the chiefdom was separated from the Commissioner's office in
Potgietersrus by a good two-hour walk, and since the town was noted for its hostile
racism and complete lack of facilities for black visitors, the chief went to the
Commissioner's as little as possible.12 While the Commissioner was often more keen to
see the chief, the non-existent roads over which he had to drive probably presented some
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deterrent. Yet, despite these transport difficulties, it must be noted that compared to
other chiefdoms in the area, Valtyn was comparatively closer to Potgietersrus and its
degree of interaction with the Commissioner's office was consequently higher. Overall,
however, such interaction was still relatively limited.
For the chief, then, writing letters held several attractions, one of which was that they
minimized personal dealing with the Commissioner. Another advantage was that by
using such correspondence, chiefs could borrow the power of literacy. Like medieval
lords who could use their signet rings to 'sign' documents without themselves being fully
literate, many chiefs surrounded themselves with the paraphernalia of writing and
bureaucracy and paid great attention to things like letterheads and rubber stamps.13
Through these accoutrements, chiefs announced themselves entitled and authorized to
participate in a documentary culture.
Yet, in participating, however indirectly, in a literate universe, the chiefs and their allies
were simultaneously changing the meaning and uses of documents. By bathing
documents in the stream of orality, they subordinated them to the prevailing practices
and procedures of an oral world. An oft-quoted example of the transformative power
of orality is the way in which much writing emanating from paraliterate communities
mimics speech. This cross-over is generally cited as an instance of a new technology
camouflaging itself in the old.14 Another, slightly stronger, reading of this situation is to
think of the practitioners of the old technology forcing the new to conform to their values
and views. In so far as a technology of communication is woven into a wider set of
cultural and political ideas, this clash between forms of representation has a number of
implications.
One of these concerns the way in which oral transactions focus attention on a set of social
relationships and a group of actors. Literate technology shifts the emphasis away from
the actors towards the text which progressively tends to be divorced from both its
producers and consumers. This alienation is not something that oral communities easily
allow, and in many oral situations there is a Strugs'- *o keep documents accountable to
the circumstances from which they come. As part of the same process, people also try
to make documents ring with the human voices that spoke them and the social
relationships that necessitated their creation in the first instance.
The first strategy in this struggle was to write as one spoke. While such a style may
arguably be entirely predictable, it nevertheless kept alive the idea of a letter or document
as part of a conversation that linked people in particular relationships of powrer and
obligation. In keeping with these trends, most letters to the komosasi (Commissioner)
bear the 'imprint' of the human voice. Many of these letters also start in media res, a
technique which inserted the letter in an ongoing relationship. One such letter began,
"My Lordship, allow me please to continue my personal explanation in order to give
more light in the matter.* Another said, " First of all, I greet you very much. Sir, I went
on safely out of Mapela's Location....My journey took me two days, on account of the
scarcity of the buses or that some of the bridges were destroyed by heavy water."15
Another letter-writer felt it necessary to imply the social network from which he came
and so signed off his letter, "I am Jeconias Lcbelo. Lebelo's son." Yet another
correspondent attempted to remind the Commissioner of his obligations by announcing,
"I am here to inform the commissioner that I have passed carpentry."16
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In sending messages, most people still laid more store by the spoken, rather than the
written word. Consequently, letters were often accompanied by messengers who would
report the substance of the information, embellish the contents of the document they
carried, or answer any questions the recipient might have. "Owing to sickness," a
headman in Zebedicla wrote (or had written on his behalf), "I am sending herewith two
men of my section who can give you the whole proceedings of the meeting-../ Another
writer felt it necessary to apologize for sending a letter, "I am sorry to report this through
letter. I wanted to report it personally but unfortunately my bicycle is not in order.
Saturday seems too long to come on foot." Letters could also act as dramatic props, and
one chief sent a woman who wanted to apply for a store permit with a document that
began, "By this letter I say the Government may see herewith a girl."17
Another way to embed the spoken voice on the printed page was to reappropriate the
written in terms of phonetic spelling. In terms of this practice, one correspondent wrote
that "we spek ablcation to make shop". Another asked the Commissioner "why you
navcr ask awar letter" which had been for a "lessense " to "sale soap mill mill and parafin
oil". Yet another letter, which like many others relies heavily on the language of
supplication and cb'entship, combines phonetic spelling, direct translation from the
Scsotho and the oral, performance language of the church. The letter concluded, "The
covernorment he will look for [that is, look after] us. Amen."18
The full impact of this 'spoken' writing did not often reach "the ears of the government"
as skilful translation often shrivelled the repetitive and additive style of oral speech into
the clipped formalities of bureaucratic English.19 In expressing their opposition to a new
council system, one community wrote as follows:
With respect Sir Amen
I say that everybody at Kamola, they do not like the Council and its power at all.
Truly we do not like it. The entire lekgotla of Doomdraai they do not like it one
little bit. You know that we do not like the Council. We are in a difficult position,




A fairly tactful translator got hold of this letter and rendered it as follows:
Sir, with respect Amen. The residents of Kamola Area are very much against a
Local Council. Every body at Dorrondrae. Sir I wish to tell you every body hates
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The letter which is in a Sindebele-tinged Sesotho with Afrikaans echoes reads as follows:
Kaboikokobetso Morena Amen
Kere Lekhutta le kamola gaberaie eseng kakgonthe garerate kgarebeso la Councert. Ruri
garerate lekgotla. Kamoka far Dorrondrae gabaerate eseng legaele garajani. Otsebe gore
garerate Conncerl. Reapatana Reapatana garerate Cowtcerl. Otsebe gore garerate.
I Rimain
Johannes Mashishi
My thanks to Kgomotso Masemola for help with translation.
Alongside this aural appropriation, many letter writers also reshaped bureaucratic
language to their own ends and according to their own understandings. One typical way
in which this conversion occurs is by rendering the abstract, concrete, and many abstract
nouns beloved of bureaucracy like 'permission', 'notice' and 'advice', were made to render
signal service as concrete nouns or transitive verbs. So, letters frequently requested
"advices", "a notice" or "a permission note".21 Similarly, chiefs requested Native
Commissioners to "permission" applicants "to make shop". The noun 'bearer', which
appeared on crucial papers like travel passes in the form "Allow bearer to...", was often
born again as a verb. "I also bearer him as far as I know him as a good man," wrote Chief
"Makapan" in recommending a butchery applicant to the Commissioner's office.
Elsewhere someone appealed to the Commissioner in characteristically concrete terms:
"I am going about bearing my complain...behind my back which I do not know who
will take it of from my back."22
Another indirect way in which orality affected correspondence was to render the act of
writing and authorship visible. Such a process was, of course, often unintentional but it
none the less transferred the performative inflections of oral speech on to written
discourse where a letter could "read for itself', a scribe could "pen off" or end by saying
'This comes to the stoppage of my pen". Similarly, one author focused on the physical
nature of writing itself when he declared, "I have this opportunity to draw this few line
according to my application." The verb 'draw' may, of course, be indebted to a phrase
like 'draw attention to', but even if this were the case, its use here focuses attention both
on the activity of writing and the concrete origins of the metaphorical phrase.23
A further strategy through which people used to keep the authority of orality alive was
to rely on oral witness and oral contract. The highest statement of trust was to say that
someone "spoke the judgement from his own mouth", and people frequently repudiated
written contracts, particularly those made on their behalf by browbeaten or avaricious
chiefs.24 Confronted with such situations, Native Commissioners were forced to abandon
the methods of literate government for face-to-face meeting and, at times, police
intervention. One such incident arose in the I93n- over the widely hated tribal levy
system whereby people were burdened with extra taxation to buy more land to which the
rank and file rarely got access. An irritated Commissioner described events as follows:
They flatly refused to pay the Levy, on the ground that their Headman, Lingana
Mabusela, (since dead) did not inform them of it; I pointed out that Lingana
actually signed the resolution of 6/9/1929 asking for the imposition thereof, but all
argument was of no avail. Ultimately it became necessary to invoke the aid of the
Criminal law and some 100 were sent to prison for terms ranging from six weeks
to two months.25
In defying the previous written agreement, the residents of the Mabusela ward were partly
relying on the flexibility of oral contract. As others have shown, much oral contract,
despite its claims to traditionalism, was quite contemporary in its ability to erase obsolete
or unpopular law which generally dies a quiet death. As Clanchy in his study of medieval
literacy says, "Remembered truth was also flexible and up to date...the law itself remains
young, always in the belief that it is old."26 Such flexibility, of course, cannot withstand
the relentless record of written evidence, but the residents of the Mabusela ward made a
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spirited attempt to do so. Two years after the churlish report by the Native
Commissioner they were still repudiating any written agreements and refusing to pay the
levy. As the members of the lekgotla wrote to the "magerstrcct":
We shill never pay that the trablc leve because we never agreed about it when we
where there in the meeting we was face to face we have till every thing about this
trable leve that we can't pay the thing.37
While literate bureaucrats believed implicitly in the durability and fixity of the printed
word, this is probably not how writing must have seemed to many. As Clanchy has
pointed out for medieval literacy, in the early stages of writing various forms of forgery
flourish. Under such circumstances, it is the malleability and impermanence of the
written word that must appear paramount.28 While the extent of forgery in Transvaal
chiefdoms is not at all clear, there is evidence to suggest that there were instances of this
'literate' crime, particularly in connection with the collection of tribal levies. In this
regard, literate court messengers often cheated people or bamboozled them with the
paraphernalia of receipt books and stamps.29
There were other instances in which the malleability of apparently fixed documents
emerged. One such instance occurred in 1937 when the self-same Mabuscla community
hired a lawyer to challenge a levy proclamation in court. As the wording of the levy was
ambiguous, it was declared ultra vires. It must have been a rather embarrassed Native
Commissioner who had to convey this information to the people concerned. At this
meeting one apparently ingenuous speaker asked him to explain exactly "how many
words were wrong in the last Proclamation".30 One would give a lot to have heard the
tone in which these words were delivered but, like so many bureaucratic genres, minutes
of meetings do not allow us such indulgences.
As the Mabusela episode shows, an insistence on orality had powerful political
implications. These were further exploited by the tenaciousness with which people clung
to any oral agreements made with the Native Commissioner's office. As the Native
Commissioner was at times forced to abandon his desk and speak to the chief and people
concerned, a lot of agreements in their eyes were oral and, even after years had passed,
chiefs or their representatives would continue to insist on various oral promises being
honoured. As written records were often lost or burned, and as Native Commissioners
changed with great frequency, such requests could safely be embellished or even
invented.31
While an insistence on orality offered some practical and material advantages, it also
offered metaphorical ones whereby the idea and image of the voice became central to
much political discourse. People frequently acted on advice spoken to them in dreams
(another interesting non-literate form), while the call of the ancestors became a key
political metaphor. Again in connection with tribal levies, a group living just north of
Pretoria were hit with particularly hefty levy payments in the late 1920s. Some of their
more imaginative leaders suddenly recalled that the community had historical links to the
chiefdom of Mokopane, which incidentally had much lower levy payments. The
Assistant Native Commissioner interviewed the leaders concerned to inquire what had
brought this change of allegiance. He reported the interview as follows:
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When questioned by me as to the reason why they now, after this long lapse of
years, want to come under the jurisdiction of Barend Makapan, they replied, That
their father is calling them.'32
This stress on the voice as the basis of much political life also took its surreptitious toll
on the procedures of the Native Commissioner's office as officials were forced again and
again to explain written documents. It was, of course, the sheer number of non-literates
who necessitated this verbal glossing of written documents. Yet in these interactions it
was their cultural tastes which prevailed as the arcane documents of a literate culture were
baptized in living practice by being explained, interpreted and covered with the spoken
voice. It was just such a situation that one Commissioner encountered when he had to
explain a bond to an audience that had no desire to finance the land for which their chief
had signed. This is how the peeved Commissioner described his encounter in a letter to
the Secretary for Native Affairs in which he demanded that the people concerned be
forced to apologize.
I strongly resent the attitude taken up by these natives. The Bond was read over
word for word by me in the presence of Mr. Attorney Slabbert to some 400 or 500
natives belonging to the tribe of Jonas Makenna. It was also explained by me
thoroughly so that there was no mistake about it -1 am thoroughly acquainted with
the Sesutto language and the interpretation of the Bond by Makenna was not
faulty."
This necessity for oral commentary and exegesis was a task that officials often had to
undertake. Another Commissioner wrote as follows to his superiors:
The report of the Assistant Director of Native Agriculture and the Senior Chemist
of the Department of Agriculture and the map drawn by the Assistant Engineer,
Native Affairs Department was explained to the best of my abilities to the
meeting.34
This enshrouding of the written document in oral commentary formed part of a complex
linguistic situation in which the Native Commissioner's office in Potgietersrus operated.
While most Commissioners could speak Sesotho, they were often not entirely proficient
and most letters coming into the office were translated into English. Letters sent to the
chief were either in Sesotho or English. However, as the chiefs court comprised
Sindcbclc speakers (although most were proficient in Sesotho), one could have a situation
whereby letters from the chief to the Commissioner could be dictated in one language
(Suidebele), written in another (Sesotho), translated, and read in a third (English).
Similarly, if a letter went from the Commissioner to the chief, it could be written in
English, translated into Sesotho and read out in translation in Sindebeie. All of this was
extremely time consuming and often formed a source of annoyance to officials.
In their response to the tactics of performance politics, the Native Commissioner's office
often behaved as one would expect of a literate bureaucracy. Much of their energy went
into trying to promote the kind of literacy that they believed would make people
governable. This battle to impose 'orderly government' on the performance politics of
the "theatre state" was waged in joyless campaigns centred on issues of protocol,
grammar, procedure and etiquette.35 In endless letters and meetings, various
Commissioners at the Potgietersrus office nagged and threatened on how to give speeches
and compose letters (always with a date, never in pencil). Vexed by the apparent
flexibility of customary law, Native Commissioners frequently requested that laws be
codified and printed. In the end, most chiefs came to request such books which, along
32
 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 32, 2/8/2, Additional Native Commissioner (hereafter AD.N.C.) to N.C.,
21/10/29.
33
 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 32, 2/9/2, S.N.C to S.N.A., 19/3/20.
w T.A., T.A.D., KPT 41, 2/11/6, A.N.C to C.N.C., 8/9/39.
35
 Phrase from C. Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bali (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980).
with things like date stamps and letterheads, were the few risible performance
accoutrements that literate power allows.16
Yet, try as hard as they might, the dream of making the subordinate more pliable through
literacy was a far-fetched one. Apart from having a hopelessly patchy presence, literacy,
if riot flatly resisted, was furthermore appropriated and domesticated by the subordinate
in selective ways. It was not a situation to encourage the smooth exercise of power. Or,
as Benita Parry phrases it,
the fracturing of the colonialist text by re-articulating it in broken English, perverts
the meaning and message of the English book...and therefore makes an absolute
exercise of power impossible.37
However, the exercise of power depends not only on good grammar, and in its quest for
control the Native Affairs Department from the 1920s turned to more coercive and
embracing forms. One part of this strategy was to write white authority into the
landscape, and from the 1930s platoons of agricultural officers, vegetable garden advisors,
prickly pear exterminators, surveyors, bull castrators, engineers, dipping inspectors, soil
conservation officials, irrigation scheme planners, veld improvement officers, and forest
rangers invaded the countryside in an attempt to mark and possess it in as many ways
as possible. However, for this political inscription to have any meaning, it required a rigid
'grammar' to keep it in place and it was largely the fence that performed this function.
II
The story of fencing in the chiefdom properly begins in 1890 when the Location
Commission penned the polity into 12 726 hectares from which about 10 000 people had
to subsist.18 The area was renamed Valtyn's location. The two adjoining chiefdoms
suffered a similar fate and ended up being known as Mapela's location and Bakenberg
location. Together these three chiefdoms lay in a narrow, solid block, 17 kilometres long
and 5 kilometres wide, that housed some 30 000 people (see Fig. III).39
In making its decisions, the Location Commission mostly looked at where people lived
and declared this the location. Much grazing and arable land was consequently lost. In
Valtyn this loss was particularly sharply felt on its new western boundary which after
1890 became the Mogalakwena River. This river had always been a major source of
water and most of the chiefdom's lands were situated on its banks - most particularly the
eastern one but to a lesser extent the western one. Behind this narrow band of fields on
the 'west bank', a range of hills rose sharply and it was here that cattle were grazed and
once a year young boys were sent to be circumcised.
3* Paragraph based on T.A., T.A.D., KPT 31, 2/8/2, S.J.P., Zebediela to N.C., 6/5/31; KPT 12,
1/15/4, Pilsu [sic] of Native Chiefs and Headmen held at the N.C.'s Office, 16/2/34; and KPT
32, 2/8/2, Moses Kgobe to N.C, 6/12/29.
37
 B. Parry, "Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse', Oxford Literary Review, 9,
1-2, 1987,42.
38
 This section is drawn from 1. Hofmeyr, "Nterata'/The Wire': Fences, Boundaries and
Cultural Resistance in the Polgietersrus District", International Annual of Oral History, 1990,
forthcoming, 1991.
39
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1938; KPT 31, 2/8/2, Verslag: Naturelle Sake: Potgietersms, n.d.; SN 2, Report on Native
Tribes in the Transvaal, 24/11/1879; and C.A.D., NTS 7748, 6/35, Extracts from the Minutes
of the Late Location Commission, 26/5/1890.
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It was on this 'west bank' that the silent fence war began in earnest. While this struggle
around fencing often seemed quiet and invisible, the tactical and ideological battle on
both sides could become fierce and was often fought quite literally over feet and inches.
For the desperately overcrowded chiefdom residents, every scrap of land was crucial.
As one old man said, "The Europeans are fond of shifting beacons", so fond, in fact, that
when the chiefdom was surveyed in 1936 its surface area turned out to have shrunk from
its official size as determined in 1913 of 14 541 hectares to 12 229 hectares.40 Most white
farmers, on the other hand, considered nothing as too much. Indeed, in later years the
rabid cry of many farmers in regard to black land was to become "not an inch more".41
This cry, however, was only to emerge forcefully in the 1920s and '30s. Back in the
1890s, things did not appear so urgent, largely because the rather vague boundary lines
that the Location Commission had ordained remained entirely unfenced and completely
hypothetical. Surrounded by company-owned land or unoccupied private farm land, the
residents of Valtyn paid little heed to boundaries and carried on with their lives as before.
Yet, by the turn of the century, fencing had become more common and according to both
oral and written sources, 'the wire' first came to the Potgietersrus district shortly after the
South African War.42 For those living within Valtyn, their first experience of fencing
probably came in 1903, when the Berlin Mission station that straddled town and location
land began fencing.
This limited impact of fencing soon began to broaden as improving farmers started
seeping into the fertile south of the district, attracted by company land which came on
to the market at this time in significant amounts. It was from this point that the first
concerted attempts to "pull the wire" and "fence the line" emerged.43 As Valtyn's location
lies in the extreme south of the district, it was one of the first areas to witness systematic
fencing, and in 1904 an East Coast Fever fence began to make its way along the
chiefdom's western boundary.
However, in erecting the fence, it was by no means self-evident where it should go. The
old South African Republic Location Commiss;'.. had left ambiguous records and
surveys of the boundaries, while the Mogalakwena River which putatively formed the
boundary has a wide, reedy and often marshy bed, not to mention a winding course.
Eventually a give-and-take policy was followed whereby the fence, like a kebab stick,
skewered the bends of the river."4
As all three chicfdoms lay on arable soil similar to the clay and loam of the Springbok
flats, some farmers soon came to regard them with avaricious eyes.45 Other farmers who
lived north-east of the chiefdom felt themselves to be trapped in a corridor between two
black 'blocks' made up of the three locations Tjelow' them and two others - Matlala and
Masasane - 'above' them (see Fig. III). If both groups of farmers could have had their
way, all five locations would have been swept further north into marginal bushveld areas
and it was this course of action that they recommended in their evidence to the Stubbs
Land Commission of 1918. In 1925 this call for removal was strengthened when the
Prime Minister, General J.M.B. Hertzog, paid a visit to the area. Platinum had been
40
 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 13, 2/28/7/4, Minutes of Tribal Meeting at Mapela Location, 30/8/39.
Figures from KPT 41, 2/11/6, Undated document headed "Valtyn's Location: Potgietersrust,
Location Reclamation Survey".
41
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UG14-1948, 1.
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 Hosea Bowale, interviewed by Peter Lekgoathi, Tamaties, Zebediela district, 5/5/89; and T.A.,
T.A.D., KPT 51, 8/18/31/1, Minutes of meeting held at Zebediela location, 9/6/31, statement
by Induna Charlie Kekana.
« T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/17, Chief Makapan to N.C., 15/9/38; and 2/54/3/12, Frans
Seaneko to N.C., 23/7/49.
44
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Potgietersrust Centenary 1854-1954 (Potgietersrust: Central Centenary Committee, n.d.), 157.
11
discovered near Bakenberg, Mapela and Valtyn, and because of this Hertzog called for
the removal of the locations.46
His was a point of view shared by the Potgietersrus Town Council and the by growing
number of poor whites who congregated in the village in the 1920s and '30s, many
originating from farms bought by the state after 1936 when the area for black occupation
was marginally increased. Most residents of this town resented living cheek by jowl with
a densely settled town location and chiefdom. At every available opportunity they called
for removal in language whose shrill racism increased sharply as Afrikaner nationalist
campaigning got under way.47
These removals, however, never occurred and, having failed to move people out, farmers
had to settle for the next option - fencing in. And from the 1920s farmers began calling
for compulsory fencing, largely through their associations that started to appear during
that decade.48 Some of the first farms to be sold to private owners lay on the chiefdom's
'west bank' and it was from here that a renewed offensive was launched to rebuild the
East Coast Fever fence. By the 1930s fencing, or attempts to fence, had gone up much
of the three chiefdoms' boundaries. In addition to these private schemes, from the
mid-1930s the Native Affairs Department launched various anti-erosion and
rehabilitation schemes that often brought fencing inside the chiefdom for the first time.
By the 1940s the impact of this fencing, both internal and external, had become
far-reaching.
The first and most immediate of these changes had to do with overcrowding in terms of
land and stock. By 1906 chiefdom dwellers complained of a shortage of land as well as
water which the town of Potgietersrus siphoned off in increasing volume.49 This pressure
on land soon began to tell in terms of migrancy and by 1918 70 per cent of men from the
Potgietersrus area were said to be working down the mines.50 By the 1930s overcrowding
had become chronic, and Valtyn was likened to the Sahara desert and singled out by
betterment planners as "one of the worst in the ^^nsvaal".51 For this reason, Valtyn
became one of the first areas in the Transvaal to experience anti-soil erosion measures,
veld reclamation schemes and other such projects that clustered under the betterment
banner.52
In addition to pressure on arable land, internal fencing aggravated the critical shortage
of pasture. As far as the Native Affairs Department was concerned, the answer was to
cull. However, resistance to such schemes proved so implacable that for a long time
other options had to be pursued. One of these involved fencing for "controlled grazing"
which heightened pressure on existing pasture. It was, ironically, a pressure that affected
46
 T.A., C.A.D., NTS 3544, 498/30, S.N.A. to P.J.D. Pieterse, n.d.
47
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19/5/25; and 4/7/4/1, C. Stewart Coppen to R.M., 23/4/26.
49
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small herd owners more than large ones since those with a lot of cattle generally had the
wherewithal to hire grazing from the white farmers who rented out pasture in the area.53
By the 1930s most Transvaal locations manifested fairly sharp stratification, and in
Zebediela, for example, which lay close by, one man had 171 hectares which he ploughed
with eight span of oxen while others worked between a half and four hectares with
borrowed cattle.54 Valtyn was in all probability much the same, and like other
surrounding locations possessed a wafer-thin stratum of 'progressive' farmers. It was
often this new elite who, together with the old chiefly caste, became the beneficiaries of
internal fencing and had privileged access to the land which these fences set aside.55 In
terms of land, cattle holdings and social division, fencing played no small part in
reinforcing old cleavages and creating new forms of stratification.
Apart from land and cattle holdings, fencing also interfered in daily life, particularly as far
as women were concerned. As was the case with the western boundary give-and-take
line, fences often cut off access to water. Apart from often necessitating longer journeys
to fetch household water, such fences could also deprive washerwomen who did town
laundry for their livelihood.56
However, one of the biggest bones of contention remained reeds which often ended up
on the wrong side of the fence. A standard item in house building and domestic fencing,
reeds also had a wide range of other uses, and apart from being used to construct musical
instruments, they also featured prominently in folklore and mythology. Many Nguni
traditions, for example, associate reeds with creation, and in the central Transvaal local
Ndebele historians identify Mhlanga (a name derived from 'reed') as the first Ndebele
chief in the Transvaal. Not surprisingly, given the importance of reeds in everyday life,
the act of their cutting, in some Transvaal societies, symbolizes one of the founding acts
of human civilization."
Rivers in general are seen to hold mythological power, and in the Transvaal as elsewhere
they inspire any number of dinonwane. In addit; ,.*, the Mogalakwena featured in the
annual initiation ceremonies in which boys were said to cross over {go weld) from
boyhood to adulthood. In going to and from the circumcision lodge, it was the
Mogalakwena that the young boys crossed.58 In losing access to river frontage, both
material and cultural wealth evaporated from people's lives.
There were other kinds of cultural changes that fencing precipitated. One concerned
changes to the power of the chief who traditionally held the right to declare the seasonal
start to reed cutting. With the tremendous demand on shrinking reed resources, this was
probably one of the first prohibitionary powers of the chief to fall into abeyance.59
Another cultural change concerned oral history and memory. In addition to the standard
items of genealogy and battle history that skilled remembrancers recalled, a memory for
beacons, meetings with Native Commissioners, farmers and agricultural officers now
became crucial.
« T.A., C.A.D., NTS 10211, 6/423/2, C.N.C. to S.N.A., 16/2/39.
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In trying to assess the intangible cultural changes that fencing occasioned, it is important
to stress that chicfdom residents did not see fencing as a discrete issue. Instead they
probably understood it as part of a more general white invasion whose object was to
possess the land in as many ways as possible. One aspect of this possession involved
marking the land in every conceivable manner, be it with fences, ploughs, bulldozers,
graders, pegs, theodolites, boreholes, roads, farmhouses, plantations, contour banks, grass
strips and what have you. The slightest sign of white activity on the land was seen as
presaging imminent land loss.
Fencing, then, in the popular imagination, formed part of a wider net of white control.
Small wonder that today at least one old man remembers fencing and literacy as
intimately tied.
The issue offences was brought about by literacy [go bala]...\t was found out that
when the Boers claimed land for themselves they did not know how to measure it.
The English brought theodolites [dilandmeter] with them....The Boers never had
fences. Even today no-one can say he saw them putting up a fence. They had no
skills in putting up a fence. They did not know how to do the corners. [The
Boers] did not measure the land. They just used their heads, now they just said,
This area, from here to that tree...it is my land.'60
Given that many planners often encouraged fencing as it would make herd boys
redundant and so force them to school, the old man's perceptions contain much
wisdom.61 His words also illustrate the extent to which views of fencing and boundaries
are embedded in certain cultural forms of understanding and it is to this topic that we
now turn.
As any number of studies of colonial culture have shown, settlers almost invariably saw
the countryside as a blank page on which they could write their authority.62 Not
surprisingly, many saw boundaries as akin to the 'ritten word. Once inscribed on a
surveyed diagram, a line, like the printed word, came to represent a supposedly fixed and
permanent reality. However, to make a boundary meaningful one requires a fence that
both fixes the line and represents it spatially as a thin, sheer wall. This verticalness of the
fence is important since it embodies another aspect of colonial understandings of
boundaries which are generally seen to sink below the earth's surface and rise above it.
This idea of height and depth was extremely important to colonial understandings of land
possession. African agriculture, for example, was considered derisory largely because it
was seen as 'shallow'. Colonial farmers, on the other hand, ploughed 'deeply' and so
apparently possessed - and earned a right to - the land in a way quite distinct from
African farmers. In the perception of the Native Affairs Department, Africans did not
'love the soil" which under their "scratching" became "thin" and "bodiless". Europeans,
on the other hand, practised "good husbandry" and made the soil "thick" by adding
manure and fertilizer.63 Alongside this folkloric language, the more scientific vocabularies
of geology and surveying also embody notions of possession. Both these disciplines
generate the illusion of a saturated knowledge of the earth that stretches both horizontally
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Apart from fixing such boundaries, fences, as far as the Native Affairs Department and
their betterment schemes were concerned, played an important demarcation and
'containing' function in that they marked off the various zones set aside for grazing,
residence, agriculture and so on. These zones, in turn, formed part of an ambitious
scheme to survey, document, change and so control rural societies. Such visions of
control were heavily tied up with notions of bureaucratic and documentary order.
Central to the implementation of these visions was the fence, which increasingly came to
be thought of in quasi-literate terms. Policy documents, for example, frequently included
phrases like "maintenance of beacons and proper records", a juxtaposition that says a lot
about the close symbolic kinship that boundaries and literate documentation enjoyed in
the minds of policy makers.64
This cultural perception of fencing was also apparent in the role that boundaries played
in marking and maintaining identity. One farmer, for example, wanted to fence not only
because the chiefdom's cattle trampled his land, drank his water and inseminated his prize
cows, but also because he wanted symbolically to fence off the savage darkness around -
and, no doubt, within - him. Or, as he explained it, "I am alone and they are a dark
multitude.""
These fantasies of possession and demarcation played a powerful role in shaping colonial
ideologies. Once on the earth, however, they became much less clear cut. Unlike the
printed page, the countryside is seldom smooth or flat, and once one has to transfer the
boundary line of the diagram into the reality of the veld there are, of course, rivers, hills,
trees and bumps to confound the best laid plans. While boundaries remain unfenced,
such issues do not surface. However, once fencing starts going up, the problems of
determining the supposedly fixed boundary become apparent. And as any number of
hapless Native Commissioners were to learn, any attempt to solve such problems had to
involve at least some discussion and negotiation between both parties, negotiations that
furthermore had to be held in the heat of the day, on the spot and orally. These in loco
inspections or pointing-out ceremonies, as they came to be known, had by the 1930s
become a standard feature of rural life.
To the residents of Valtyn who lived in a society where property rights were transmitted,
conferred and negotiated by oral testimony and contract, such ceremonies must probably
have seemed like simple good manners.66 However, if the form of the ceremony was
familiar, then the idea of a pencil-thin boundary was not. As with most oral societies,
the residents of Valtyn did not see boundaries as sharp lines riven into the earth by
fencing. Rather, from linguistic evidence, it would seem that indigenous understandings
stress the boundary as something that lies lightly on the earth. So, for example, in
Sesotho, one puts down a boundary {go bea moltwane). As matters finally turned out,
this perception had much ironic wisdom. Colonial officials and farmers frequently
moved, redirected and simply gerrymandered boundaries. A boundary, then, was indeed
something put on the earth that could, like a ribbon, be moved somewhere else.
This loose precolonial sense of boundary does not mean that notions of territory and
demarcation were unknown. What was, of course, unfamiliar was the notion that
boundaries could be marked in such precise terms. In the past, where boundaries did
exist, such as between fields or homes, these were marked with broad bush fences in
contrast to which the fence cut an exceedingly stark contrast. It is still this idea of thin
harshness that the word terataj nterata, from the Afrikaans draad (wire), exemplifies. The
official and 'polite' Afrikaans word for fence is heining, but by popular choice it was the
64
 T.A., T.A.D., HK.N 33, 42/0, Undated document headed "Discussion on Land Regulations
of Trust Land Acquired since 1936*. This discourse of documentary control characterizes
most Native Affairs Department policy statements. For further examples see Union of South
Africa, Review of the Activities of the Department of Native Affairs 1944-45, UG44-1946, 32-3.
« T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/28/7(38), P.J. du Preez to N.C., 18/10/45. Translated.
66
 I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (London: Frank Cass, 1970), 200-201;
and J.L. ComaroflT and S. Roberts, Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
15
thinness of the wire rather than the fence as a whole that seemed most striking and it is
this idea that popular parlance has preserved.
On both sides of the fence it was generally these unstated ideas that were to guide how
people approached the whole issue of boundary disputes. And as the struggles around
fencing got under way, it was largely these cultural conventions that people mobilized in
their resistance.
In the war of the fences there were a number of crucial steps, and the first of these
concerned where the fence would go. Most frequently this procedure began when a
farmer whose property bordered on the chiefdom gave notice of his intention to fence.
After he had lodged the official papers, the technicalities of where the fence would go and
how it would be built had to be arranged. This could happen in a number of ways but
generally it involved a meeting of the farmer, Native Commissioner and the chief,
accompanied by a retinue of up to Fifty followers. Together, they would all congregate
at the beginning of the boundary and decide on the exact placing of the fence. Such
ceremonies could last for several hours and on at least one occasion an elderly chief
"sagged out" from exhaustion.67 In the negotiations, both farmer and chief would indicate
where they felt the fence should go, and, in most instances, the Native Commissioner
would make the final decision.68
From the vantage of the Native Affairs Department head office in Pretoria, the issue of
new fencing should have been quite straightforward. Not surprisingly for a literate
bureaucracy, the Department was deeply attached to the notion of a true and fixed
boundary, and in the case of any fencing dispute they would refer authoritatively to the
neat lines on surveyors' diagrams which assumed the status of holy texts.69
However, as any weary Native Commissioner could tell you, the situation on the ground
was sheer heresy. To begin with, much nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
surveying could be charmingly vague, and the possibility of determining boundaries with
any exactness only came with the countrywide ne*- ork of beacons known as primary
triangulation. But as primary triangulation only made its way to the Northern Transvaal
between 1933 and 1953, the possibility of determining boundaries with any degree of
precision was remote.70 To confound matters further, beacons took a perplexingly wide
range of forms that included cement structures, cairns, wooden pegs in the ground and
features of the landscape like trees. These objects were variously shifted, pinched,
destroyed, ploughed over, stolen for mining pegs, and used for target practice, and many
officials spent fruitless hours trying to find them.71 Those that remained were often of an
indeterminate status since the untutored eye had little way of distinguishing a boundary
beacon from a subdivision beacon. To add to this unholy confusion, the landscape itself
often changed over time, and in a wide river bed, for example, the channel of the river
could shift by several hundred metres.72
Against this background, the idea of a true and fixed boundary could only be a fiction,
and it was one that those in the chiefdom often exposed. T h e boundary," said one chief,
"is unknown. Who knows the boundary and that is it correct?...We do not trust the
Europeans." He continued, The Europeans informed me some months ago that they
67
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had had the line surveyed because they themselves did not know the line.* If, as was
apparent, the line was indeed unknown, then it became crucial to find it, preferably in a
favourable place.73 Towards this end both sides mobilized all available resources to swing
the decision in their favour.
The fust such resource that people called on was oral memory. In any event, much of
the negotiation on the spot had perforce to be orally conducted, but as the records room
of the Native Commissioner's office in Potgietersrus had burned down in 1926 the role
of oral memory became crucial. Most often, this memory took the form of competing
versions of local history that involved genealogies of previous Native Commissioners and
the decisions and determinations that they had made. So, for example, in 1920 one
Native Commissioner reported that despite the 'west bank' line having been settled in
1909, a delegation from the chief "persistently st[u]ck to their story that they were told
by the late Mr. W.A. King [a former Native Commissioner 1 that they were entitled to
graze their cattle west of the Mogalakwena River and that in a dispute with the owner,
King had ruled they were entitled to the ground".74 Farmers similarly developed their own
oral traditions which they passed on by word of mouth to new farmers, often, according
to one Native Commissioner, having "'forgotten' or 'inadvertently' pointed out an
incorrect line". This quotation, in turn, came from the letter of a previous incumbent
of the Native Commissioner's office in Potgietersrus who had been asked to recall - from
oral memory - his understanding of the boundary position.75
In this business of oral memory, the chiefly representatives were, of course, exceptionally
skilled and, in certain instances, people would remember details with extraordinary clarity
for three or more decades. However, coming from the powerless, as these versions did,
they carried little weight. Furthermore, these oral Nestors now found themselves
confronted with a literate bureaucracy whose record keeping undermined the flexibility
that much oral memory presupposes.76
Even if the chiefdom's residents received an unfavourable decision, they never gave up
entirely on the idea of negotiation, and would -:u^en proceedings at every available
opportunity. Such opportunities arose whenever a new Native Commissioner or
Magistrate took over. One of the first deputations these new officials received invariably
concerned the western boundary of Valtyn's location.77 People also actively created
pretexts for reopening the boundary determination, most often by losing or burning the
official diagram sent from head office. In requesting a new copy, one could
simultaneously broach the issue anew.78
Another way to keep negotiation open was to hire one's own surveyor. When a
boundary was particularly unclear, either the farmers or often the Native Affairs
Department would get in a private or government surveyor. On such occasion the chief
would respond by employing his own surveyor, much as one hired one's own lawyer.79
Wedded as most white farmers were to the notion of a true and fixed boundary, they
viewed this action of the chief with great mirth. Any surveyor, the farmers argued, would
reach the same decision. The chief, however, knew that there was more than one way
to determine a line. The shambolic history of surveying in the Northern Transvaal made
every boundary worth checking, and surveyors, often working off different maps, could,
73
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indeed, reach different decisions.80 Also, given the solidarity of white officials and
"conscienceless"81 farmers, any boundary was worth double checking. Even if the two
surveyors' decisions concurred, calling them in usefully stalled the erection of the fence
for a while. Finally, people could also resort to more forceful, popular forms of
negotiation, and at one pointing-out ceremony, "three to four malcontents made matters
difficult".82 Yet, whatever these de jure findings, both sides knew this was simply the
beginning of the story. What really counted in the long run was the de facto positioning
of the fence.
In this part of the battle, the chief and his followers came into their own. Using tactics
of determined procrastination, they could often effectively delay or redirect fencing with
a tenacity that drove farmers to exasperation. The one major weapon they wielded in this
struggle was control of labour. The cost of the fence was, in theory, to be shared jointly,
although according to the Fencing Act of 1912, farmers could borrow the money from
the Land Bank. The chief, on the other hand, had by the same law to pay, in some
instances from tribal funds and in others from levies. The one small tactic the chief had
was to offer free labour to meet the chiefdom's side of the bill.83
In most cases this labour would simply not arrive. If challenged by the farmer who
would have had to make his way to the chiefs capital across extremely indifferent roads,
the chief, in immaculately polite and deferential tones, would provide any number of
excuses. He was very keen to start the fencing, but a message from the Native
Commissioner had instructed him to wait.84 His people were still unhappy about the
position of the fence and he would have to call another pitso (general meeting) to discuss
the issue. The matter, he would say, requires some thought as he did not wish "to hurry
by mistake".85 In some cases the chief literally had no control over the workers who, when
confronted with little or no pay, simply went on strike.86 In other instances, the chief
could, sometimes for months on end, be unavailable.87
However, should the farmer so much as turn his back, the chief could mobilize a work
team with admirable speed. With great precision, and efficiency, they would erect the
fence in what they understood to be the "right place". In other instances, labourers would
constantly make "mistakes" and so require endless close supervision.88 Farmers, of course,
could reply in like terms, and on a number of occasions the work team arrived to find
cement poles planted along what the farmer understood to be the "right line". All that
then remained was for the workers to pull the "barbert" wire through the fencing poles.89
With regard to fencing projects within the chiefdom, the forms of resistance were even
more pronounced. Surveying equipment on more than one occasion mysteriously
suffered damage.90 In other instances, internal opposition to the chief manifested itself in
8° T.A., C.A.D., NTS 7748, 6/35, N.C. to S.N.A., 28/11/28.
<" T.A., C.A.D., NTS 7748, 6/35, S.N.C., Graskop to S.N.A., 1/7/22.
82
 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/9, Handwritten note from Agricultural Officer, 2/6/50.
83
 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/9, Meeting at N.C/s office, 20/9/49.
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 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/21, A.N.C. to A. GUberlson, 4/4/46.
85 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/17, Chief Piel Makapan to N.C, 15/9/39.
w T.A., C.A.D., NTS 9531, 138/400(69), C.N.C. to S.N.A., 5/11/37.
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89 T.A., T.A.D., KPT 14, 2/54/3/17, Tribal Meeting at Valtyn's Location, n.d.
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resistance to betterment schemes, and in Bakenberg such opposition centred on the
Mabusela ward who had previously opposed tribal levies. Following a strongly
traditionalist pattern of resistance, the Mabusela leaders said that "they [had] never
drunk water from a well and [could] do without it." As a result, expensive borehole
machinery frequently seized up because of a few intelligently placed stones.91
Once fencing was in place, people responded to it in a number of diverse and creative
ways. Mostly and wherever possible, people simply ignored it. Often fencing crossed
customary footpaths and pedestrians then either pushed the fence over or wound its
strands together so that people could pass underneath. In one instance at least, the
Native Affairs Department capitulated to this pressure by erecting stiles and gates.92 In
other instances people not only broke down the fence but stole sections as well.
Undertaken with the assistance of sharpened stones, this activity was generally aimed at
removing offending bits of wire to "facilitate the theft of grazing" as well as to gain access
to game, wood, water and pasture. In other instances, people stole wire for domestic use
and snares." By the 1940s officials were complaining of a "veritable epidemic of fence
cutting", while in 1937 the Town Clerk of Potgictersrus thought that fencing Valtyn's
location a waste of time "as not a strand would remain in place".94
The initial state responses to this fence destruction was more in word than in deed.
Officials fulminated, farmers cursed, but in practice very little happened. The Fencing
Act of 1912 threatened a £75 fine or six months' imprisonment to anyone who "wilfully
injures or removes any fence, gate or other appliance or contrivance forming part or
serving the purpose thereor, but as police were few and far between, and as people would
seldom give evidence against one another, fence destruction often went unpunished. This
situation began to change when farmers took policing into their own hands, and many
old men from Valtyn have memories of farmers 'arresting' people who crossed their
fences. In other instances the farmer leaned on the chief who in turn located the culprits
who received thrashings that are recalled to this d?w *s
If there was anything that slowed the rate of fence destruction, then it was undoubtedly
such internal policing. As both progressive farmers and the chiefly elite began
increasingly to benefit from internal fencing, chiefly retaliation against fence destruction
accelerated.96 Furthermore, given the frequency with which straying cattle were
impounded, some cattle owners probably came to see fencing as a mixed blessing.
However, in the end there was, and presumably still is, no solution to fence destruction.
A symbol and consequence of the nature of social and labour relations in the countryside,
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While the most obvious role of fencing is to enforce dispossession and make private
property a reality, it does also have a number of cultural functions that are not unrelated
to the preconceptions of literacy. The notion of a boundary on a piece of paper, for
example, is often seen by literate societies as having the same fixity as the printed text.
As the referent of the text, the fence embodies the reality of the boundary and supposedly
writes it permanently into the earth. Against the 'literacy' of the fence, the residents of
the chiefdom mobilized the resources of an oral performance culture. It was the same
set of resources that the chief and his attendants attempted to use in their political
interaction with the Native Commissioner's office. At times they successfully forced the
Commissioner to deal with them on the terms of an oral world. But as the fences
surrounded Valtyn, undermining the material base of the life to which people were
accustomed, such victories over the commissioner became irrelevant and petty. Overall,
it was the barbed wire that caged the spoken word.
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In early 1906 the French, Germans and British faced a series of
challenges to their continued subjugation of the Sokoto Caliphate.
An uprising which began in December 1905 in French Niger in the
region of Dallol Mawri and Dallol Bosso, 160 km south of Niamey and
250 km west of Sokoto, spread north up the Niger River valley past
Niamey through Zaberma and east across the boundary with British
Northern Nigeria to the vicinity of Sokoto itself. Several British
and French officials were killed. Another rising erupted in German
Adamawa, far to the east, and the call for revolt was heard in
Bauchi, Gombe, Kontagora and other parts of recently-conquered
British territory. As these events demonstrated, resistance to
colonial rule did not respect the new boundaries which European
imperial decisions had imposed on the Sokoto Caliphate. In the west
- around Sokoto and in the Niger valley - resistance against the
French and British was reasonably, well coordinated, considering the
difficulty of communication. The eastern uprising against the
Germans does not appear to have been connected with the western
movement and indeed had different roots than its western counterpart.
Nonetheless, the risings of 1906 were all Mahdist, advocated the
expulsion of the Europeans, and called for the overthrow of those
Caliphate officials who did not join the Mahdist cause. The British,
French and Germans were successful in crushing these revolts, but the
dangers presented by a coordinated revolt were real enough.2 Not
until these revolts were crushed can it be claimed that colonial rule
had been firmly established.
Although all the 1906 uprisings were couched in terms of Mahdist
doctrines, there were significant differences between the western
revolts against the French and the British and the struggle in
northern Adamawa against the Germans. The western revolts were truly
revolutionary, while the northern Adamawa struggle was an outgrowth
of the Mahdist movement in the Nilotic Sudan and, while violent and
anti-colonial, cannot be considered revolutionary. The primary
intention of this article is to explore the historical background of
revolutionary Mahdism within the context of the larger Mahdist
movement and the divisions within the Sokoto Caliphate at the time of
the colonial conquest which explain the appearance of revolutionary
Mahdism.
Because the British occupied much more of the Sokoto Caliphte
than the French and Germans combined and because British territory
included the capital districts of Sokoto and Gwandu and the most
populous and prosperous emirates, more attention is given here to
developments in the British sphere than to those of the French and
German. It can be claimed with reasonable certainty that if the 1906
uprising in the region of Sokoto and Gwandu had been successful, the
implications for the rest of the Caliphate, no matter which European
power was involved, would have been very serious indeed. The Germans
held the north-eastern and southern sub-emirates of Adamawa; the
French controlled the relatively small emirates of the Niger valley
and Liptako to the west of Gwandu and Sokoto; the British had the
central regions, the capital districts, the overwhelming majority of
the population, and the greatest land mass. Of the twenty-nine
emirates and the two capital districts which comprised the Caliphate,
the British occupied all but the western eight emirates and the
various sub-emirates of Adamawa.3
The 1906 Uprisings
The French first became aware that an uprising had been
organized when on 8 December 1905 a patrol which was attempting to
collect tax in the area between Dallol Mawri and Dallol Bosso was
attacked.4 Two gardes-cercle and two cavaliers were killed. Another
patrol went to recover the two rifles of the gardes-cercle but had to
retreat in the face of strong opposition. As will be discussed
below, these attacks were premature. The revolt was set to erupt in
early February 1906, but after these two skirmishes, there could be
no turning back. A French detachment left Niamey for the Dallols on
28 December.5
The first battle in the French zone occurred on 4 January 1906.
The Mahdists lost an estimated 30 men, the French 12, including one
French officer. The local forces of Awta, the Zarmakoy of Doso,
burned Kobkitanda, the centre of resistance, as the Mahdists
retreated to Sambera, a neighboring Mahdist stronghold. A series of
battles followed in which another twenty Mahdists died. Saybu Dan
MakafOi the nearly-blind Mahdist leader, and many of the survivors
fled east across the colonial boundary and made their way to Satiru,
which they reached sometime after mid January. 6
A second centre of revolt erupted in Zaberma, north of Niamey,
under the Wangari warlord, Maru of Karma, a former student of Dan
Makafo. The blind cleric had visited Karma before the revolt and had
sent an emissary to Maru in December 1905 to inform him of the
skirmish with the gardes-cercle. Maru threw in his lot with the
Mahdists.7 On January 8, Colonel Lamolle reported that Maru was in
revolt.
The left bank of the Niger, extending 300 km from Sorbo Haoussa
to Boubon, a mere fifteen km from Niamey, was lost, and there was
danger of the revolt spreading across the river and among the Tuareg.
The French posts at Sandire and Filingue had to be abandoned, and
troops from Dori had to fight their way back to Niamey. The French
launched their campaign against Boubon on January 17, which was taken
despite two "vigorous" Mahdist assaults. Karma, 25 km from Niamey,
was taken the next day, and Maru retreated to Simri in the semi-
desert region of Zaberma Ganda. The French then waited in the hope
that many of Maru's supporters would desert. Maru attacked a French
patrol on March 3, but reportedly suffered 30 killed and five
wounded. Simri was occupied on March 4, and once again Maru
withdrew. The end came on March 5. Maru and many of his troops were
killed, and the survivors were taken to Niamey.8 Trouble also spread
southward to Bariba and Dendi country and westward to Gurmanche.
While some Tuareg joined Maru, many others waited to see what would
happen. French reports also suspected that the.emirate of Say would
rise, but in fact it did not.9
In February, the revolt spread to British territory. The center
of resistance was the town of Satiru, located only 20 km southwest of
Sokoto and 60 km from Gwandu, the twin capitals of the former
Caliphate.l0 The town, composed of mat compounds surrounded by a mat
fence and containing an estimated population of 5,000 inhabitants,
straggled north-south along the eastern face of a small valley.ll On
February 14, a British patrol under Acting Resident Hillary marched
out to intimidate the Satiru community. The British were unaware of
the rising in French territory. The patrol met a mob of Satirawa
armed with some spears and bows and arrows but mostly with hoes, axes
and other agricultural implements.12 The WAFF detachment failed to
form a square properly; Hillary rode ahead because he thought he
could talk to the mob. Separated from his troops and blocking the
line of fire, Hillary and his escort were killed. In the resulting
confusion, the WAFF experienced heavy losses; total deaths included
three white officers and 25 African soldiers. 13 In the words of High
Commissioner Sir Frederick Lugard, this defeat was the "first serious
reverse suffered by the West African Frontier Force since it was
raised [1898]."14 Lugard and his subordinates feared that a
tremendous upheaval would ensue from this "Sokoto Rising," as the
Times headlined it.15 The British regime was thinly spread over
Northern Nigeria, and a major detachment of the WAFF was far to the
south, engaged in a protracted campaign to subdue the Tiv. The
situation appeared grave.
The Satiru Mahdists also suffered heavy losses in the initial
encounter, 30-40 dead and wounded, with their leader, Malam Isa,
severely wounded.16 Isa died on February 16th. But the Satiru
Mahdists quickly regrouped and in the aftermath of their initial
victory, they wrecked havoc on neighbouring villages. The British
thought the rebels were merely settling old scores, but in fact, the
raids punished moderates within the Mahdist community. The Satirawa
wanted to demonstrate to everyone that there could be no compromise.
What was worrisome to the British was the extent of local support for
the uprising. There were reports of widespread support and even
revolt from Katsina and Zamfara and in Sokoto town itself.17
As WAFF troops were force-marched from all parts of Northern
Nigeria, Resident Alder Burdon, a military man himself and former
commander of the Royal Niger Constabulary, applied his considerable
skills to secure the loyalty of the Sokoto aristocracy. His initial
efforts were decidedly mixed. Sultan Attahiru II and his officials
expressed their loyalty, and Marafa Maiturare of Gwadabawa - a Sokoto
official in charge of the Sarkin Musulmi's levies who later became
Sarkin Musulmi himself (1915-24) - marched on Satiru with a backing
of 3,000 horse and infantry on the morning of the 17th. But the
Marafa's troops refused to attack and retreated in disarray.18 As
one Sokoto cleric wrote at the time
We have been conquered. We have been asked to pay poll tax
r.iizyah] and jangali [cattle tax]. We have been made to do
various things, and now they want us to fight their wars
for them. I^ et them go and fight themselves.19
Neither tax had been collected in Sokoto and Gwandu before the
conquest. The Satirawa continued to spread their propaganda
throughout the countryside, even as they laid waste to those who
opposed the rebellion, and the Emir of Gwandu offered limited but
significant support to the insurgents. For the next three weeks, the
British were impotent to interfere.
Despite these heady successes, the Satiru resistance proved to
be short-lived. On March 10th, a combined expedition of the Sokoto
levies and WAFF troops marched on Satiru. Though they met fierce
resistance, the ensuing slaughter was difficult to justify, even from
an imperialist perspective. As has often been the case in historyi
religious fanaticism was no match for modern technology, in this case
represented by the maxim machine gun and the breech-loading magazine
rifle. The WAFF square formation laid low some 2,000 Satirawa, and
the charging Sokoto cavalry hacked to death many of the fleeing
survivors. An estimated 3,000 women and children, whom the Sokoto
levies mopped up, were herded to Sokoto to a life of servitude.
Implausibly, the leader, Saybu Dan Makafo, survived the
slaughter, although wounded in the final attack. He was captured by
the local levies from Dange, whose sarki took him to Sokoto. Dan
Makafo, nearly blind, suffering from his wounds, and mistreated,
bravely faced an Islamic court and reasserted his defiance. Even
then he was greatly feared. Dan Makafo's boy guide is reported to
have shouted out at the trial, when Dan Maksfo asked for water,
"Don't let him have it or he'll vanish into thin air and then I shall
be the only one left for you to execute."20 The public executioner
decapitated the hero of Satiru on March 22nd. His head, and those of
four subordinates who suffered a similar fate, was mounted on stake
in the market to serve as a dire warning to would-be Mahdists and
revolutionaries.21 The Sokoto citizenry dutifully participated in
the public humilitation of the Mahdists, As Burdon telegramed to
Lugard:
All Sokoto went out yesterday [March 11th] to
inspect battlefield and raze Satiru to ground. No wall or
tree left standing. Sarikin Muslim [Musulmi] has
pronounced curse on anyone building or farming on site.22
Thus ended the Satiru rebellion. Today the site is on the edge of a
forest reserve. It has not been inhabited since its destruction.
Mahdists also staged an uprising in northern Adamawa in early
1906.23 As will be discussed below, much of northern Adamawa and
eastern Gombe emirates had come under Mahdist domination in the 1880s
and 1890s, and hence it is not surprising that Mahdism was rife here
during the first few years of German occupation. The 1906 uprisings
were concentrated in Garoua and Maroua sub-emirates. Wouro Kohel,
near Garoua, was the most important Mahdist stronghold, but Balda,
near Maroua, was also a centre of discontent.24
Umar Jime, known locally as Goni Waday, a Shuiv*a Arab from Wadai,
led the revolt in Garoua. While his early career is not well known,
he was at the first battle of Bormi, 2 September 1901, which
establishes him as a follower the Mahdist leader, Jibril Gaini (see
below).(*s) He toured Garoua, Yola, Banyo, and other parts of
Adamawa before the German conquest, and settled at Ngaundere, where
he established a mosque. His following became large, so he left
Ngaundere and settled at Wouro Kohel, a village south of the Benue in
the territory of Garoua. By now he had attracted considerable
support among some sections of the Fulbe aristocracy, but not all.
The Germans sent soldiers to disperse Goni Waday's followers, and as
was the case at Kobkitanda and Satiru, the Mahdist forces and their
aims were not fully appreciated. Goni Waday attacked the Germans at
the village of Lagdo. Now almost all the Fulbe on the left bank of
the Benue threw their support behind the rebellion, and the time had
come to attack Garoua. At this time, Hauptmann Strumpel, the German
officer in charge of northern Cameroon was at Maroua fighting another
Mahdist leader, Al-Hajj Arabu, the former associate of the Hayatu and
once imam of Marua (see below), who resided at Balda.26 The German
force annihilitated the Mahdists and executed the Fulbe officials who
had expressed support.
A number of issues need to be addressed in examining the
circumstances surrounding the revolts at Satiru, Kobkitanda, Karma,
Garoua and Maroua. First, to what extent was there a wide-scale
plot to stage a Mahdist uprising? Second, who were the supporters of
this movement? Third, were the British, French and Germans correct
in assessing the seriousness of the revolt and therefore justified,
from an imperial perspective, in their bloody suppression?
,
The Mahdist Tradition in the Sokoto Caliphate
As Adeleye, Al-Hajj and other scholars have demonstrated,
Mahdist sentiments were widespread in the Sokoto Caliphate in the
nineteenth century.27 The thirteenth century of the Muslim era,
which ended in 1883, was a period of particularly high Mahdist
expectations, and the creation of a Mahdist state in the Nilotic
Sudan in the 1880s encouraged Mahdist sympathies further. The
colonial conquest of Northern Nigeria (1897-1903) provided yet
another reason for Mahdists to spread their propaganda. A review of
the major features of the Mahdist movement in the Sokoto Caliphate
demonstrates that the colonial powers were accurate in assessing the
potential danger of a Mahdist uprising, although they failed to
anticipate when it would occur.
The earliest Caliphate officials, including Uthman dan Fodio,
his brother Abdullahi and his son Muhammad Bello, discussed Mahdism
at length. As Al-Hajj and Biobaku have observed, ""Classical books of
Islamic eschatology were extensively read and copiously quoted by the
[Shehu and the] Shehu's companions, and their successors, in their
literary output about Mahdism."26 In Tahdhir al-ikhwan. Uthman dan
Fodio denied that he was the Mahdi, but he clearly believed that the
Mahdi would come-29 As Muhammad Bello himself reported, his father
sent him to Zamfara, Katsina, Kano and Daura, where he
conveyed to them [i.e., supporters of the jihad] his good
tidings about the approaching appearance of the Mahdi, that
the Shehu's [Uthman dan Fodio's] followers are his vanguard
and this Jihad will not end, by God's permission, until it
gets to the Mahdi. They listened and welcomed the good
news.3 °
Bello also instructed Modibbo Adama, the leader of the jihad in the
area which was to become Adamawa, to expand towards the east in
preparation for the coming of the Mahdi from that direction. As we
will see, Adamawa became closely associated with Mahdism.31
In 1820, Muhammad Bello, who by then was now Caliph, actually
predicted that the Mahdi would appear in 1863/64.3Z
Premature Mahdist assertions were dangerous to the nascent
caliphate. One Tuareg adherent, Hamma proclaimed himself Mahdi in
81811 but was summarily executed.33 Despite such harsh repression,
Mahdist expectations continued to be high throughout the rest of the
nineteenth century, and increasingly the Caliphate leadership had to
contain such beliefs. Caliph Abubakar Atiku (1837-1842), for
example, issued a proclamation declaring that the time had not yet
come "since there is still some good remaining among us."34 Other
caliphs ordered the execution of Mahdists or otherwise curtailed
them. Muhammad Bello's prediction may have restrained some would-be
activists until the 1860s, but he was not the only recognized expert
on such matters.
Other committed Muslims also attempted to determine the date of
the Mahdi's appearance, initially during the thirteenth century A,H.
and then afterwards. The Mahdi was expected to come from the east,
which was a reason why many people emigrated in that direction. He
was to appear on a mountain, which was sometimes interpreted as Bima
Hill in Gombe Emirate and explains why Bormi, a few miles to the
north of Bima Hill in the Gongola River valley, became a place of
settlement for some Mahdists.35 He would be followed by Isa
(Jesus), who would actually purge the world of unbelief (see below).
Messangers were to come before the Mahdi appeared to announce his
imminent arrival. These messangers were relatively common and were
often misunderstood by colonial officials, who thought they were
claiming to be the Mahdi.
Clerics and ordinary believers alike debated these Mahdist
doctrines. On the one hand, official interpretations of Mahdism, as
represented in the writings of Uthman dan Fodio and his successors in
the Caliphate aristocracy, tended to downplay the immediacy of the
prophesies. Stable government and Mahdist expectations of the end of
the world were incompatible. Popular manifestations of Mahdism, on
the other hand, were often displayed in the form of resistance to
Caliphate authority.
Many Mahdists demonstrated their discontent through emigration
towards the east, the direction from which the Mahdi was supposed to
appear.36 Emigration implicitly meant the rejection of the caliphate
government and was a more common expression of protest than open
rebellion. Bnigration removed dissidents from the body politic, but
most of these people were the kind of educated and devote individuals
whom the caliphate needed. Furthermore, their travels spread
unsettling doctrines throughout the Caliphate and, indeed, through
the regions to the east as far as the Nilotic Sudan.
The emigration of Mahdist supporters towards the east began
during the jihad. Uthman's brother and co-founder of the Caliphate,
Abdullahi, began such an emigration in 1806, and while his intentions
are not entirely clear with respect to his Mahdist expectations, the
emigration was a protest against the course of the jiihad, the
excesses which had been committed on the battlefield, and the
inadequacy of religious dedication on the part of some .jihad
supporters. Abdullahi ended his hijra in Kano and returned to his
place in the Caliphate leadership, ultimately becoming ruler of the
western emirates and establishing the twin capital of Gwandu.37
Another major exodus began under Caliph Abubakar Atiku in the late
1830s,38 perhaps in part because Muhammad Bello's death in 1838
marked the end of an era. The 1850s were also a period of
emigration.39 By then a new generation of Muslims had emerged, and
many clerics were not entirely satisfied with developments in the
Caliphate: aristocratic rule was firmly established, some felt to
the detriment of religious and scholarly pursuits /and the secular
concern with amassing slaves, land and luxury goods seemed to reflect
an erosion from the principles of the jihad.
As the end of the thirteenth century A.H. (1882/3) approached,
popular unrest as manifested through emigration became even more
pronounced. In 1878 one of the most important of these emigrations
occurred. Hayatu b. Sa'id, the grandson of Muhammad Bello and the
great-grandson of Uthman dan Fodio, left Sokoto after the accession
of his uncle, Caliph Muazu (1877-91), which effectively ended the
claims of his father, Sa'id, and thereby his own to the caliphate.
Personal dissatisfaction seems to explain the timing of his move and
probably influenced his turn to Mahdism. His emigration, together
with thirty-three students and numerous other dependents, was halted
in Adamawa, where Laraido Sanda warmly received him as a member of
Uthman dan Fodio's family. He stayed in Yola until 1882, whereupon he
moved further east to the sub-emirate of Bogo, on the extreme
northeastern boundary of the Sokoto Caliphate. He settled at Balda,
the residence of a son of the Bogo emir, and one of the centres of
Mahdist revolt in 1906.40 Hayatu became the most vocal and serious
critic of the Caliphate leadership and had pretensions of
overthrowing the government, particularly after he recognized Ahmad
Muhammad of the Nilotic Sudan as Mahdi,* »
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The Ansar: Supporters of Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad
Hayatu emerged as the leader of Mahdism in the last two decades
of the nineteenth century because of his aristocratic origins, his
widely recognized learning and his support for Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad
of the Nilotic Sudan. Al-Hajj has documented how emigration and the
Caliphate writings on Mahdism were directly responsible for the
emergence of the Mahdist movement of Ahmad Muhammad.42 Ahmad
Muhammad declared himself Mahdi in 1881 and subsequently expelled the
Ottoman Egyptian colonial regime from the upper Nile valley. Mahdi
Ahmad Muhammad, in turn, exerted considerable influence on the course
of Mahdism in the Sokoto Caliphate. Hayatu learned that Muhammad
Ahmad had declared himself Mahdi in 1883, as the end of the
thirteenth century of the Muslim era approached and expectations of
the Mahdi's appearance were especially strong.43 Hayatu sent
messangers to the Nilotic Sudan to pledge his loyalty and support.
Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad thereupon appointed Hayatu his representative,
amil al-Mahdi. in the West and amir al-mu'minin of the Sokoto
Caliphate. As the Mahdi's agent in the west, Hayatu acquired
considerable legitimacy in the eyes of some for his pretensions to
the Caliphate.
Hayatu's movement was particularly strong in the eastern
emirates and attracted a continuous stream of emigrants. For
example, one large emigration, prompted by Hayatu's call, was
intercepted in 1883 or thereabouts. Liman Yamusa, from Dutse in Kano
Emirate, organized an exodus which the Sokoto authorities ordered
dispersed. A Caliphate army confronted Yamusa's entourage at Shira;
the people scattered and an official escort took Yamusa to Bauchi and
apparently onto Sokoto.44 His subsequent fate is uncertain, but he
does not appear to have been a further influence on Mahdism. As this
emigration demonstrates, the activities of Hayatu and his supporters
remained a serious menace to the Caliphte government throughout the
1880s and 1890s.
Lamido Sanda of Yola adopted a permissive stance towards Hayatu.
He neither refuted Hayatu's political claims nor discouraged people
from joining the Mahdist cause, unlike emirs further to the west.
Consequently, Hayatu's influence expanded rapidly. Indeed Hayatu
succeeded in conquering many of the pagan communities which Bogo,
Maroua and the other sub-emirates in northern Adamawa had previously
failed to do." As Njeuma has noted, "By 1890, a real Mahdist
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community had emerged in northern Adamawa, covering the entire Marua-
Mandara region as far south as Mubi and attracting adherents from
several parts of the Sokoto Caliphate."46
Hayatu's subsequent career can be summarized briefly.47 The
death of Lamido Sanda and the accession of Zubeiru to the lamidate
ended the passive stance of the Yola government towards the Mahdist
cause. Hayatu had written letters to most, if not all, of the emirs
in the Caliphate, calling on them to declare for the Mahdi. These
overtures were rebuffed, and in 1893 Lamido Zubeiru organized a
military campaign to destroy Balda. This campaign proved to be a
near disaster, as many of Zubeiru's supporters refused to attack
Hayatu. Balda was sacked and perhaps burned, but Zubeiru failed to
undermine Hayatu's movement.
Hayatu now joined forces with Rabin b. Fadl, whose Mahdist
armies had marched eastward, conquering Bagirmi in 1893 and were
prepared to invade Borao.48 In late 1893, the combined forces of
Hayatu and Rabin achieved the conquest of Borno, and in 1894 Hayatu
moved to Rabin's capital at Dikwa and become Imam of Rabin's Mahdist
state. In 1898, however, the alliance between the two leaders
collapsed. Hayatu still aspired to political supremacy in the Sokoto
Caliphate. Rabih had his own agenda, and Hayatu was killed. The
French subsequently defeated Rabih in 1900, thereby ending the
political independence of Mahdism.49 Nonetheless, the numerous
followers of Hayatu and Rabih still controlled much of northern
Adamawa from Balda. The French eliminated Rabih and Rabih's son
Fadlallah (d. 1900). The Germans were left to contend with Balda and
the remnents of the ansar. The revolts of 1906 in Garoua and Maroua
were those remnents.
A second focus of Mahdist resistance in the eastern emirates was
Bormi, near Bima Hill in Gombe Emirate. As Al-Hajj has shown, Bima
Hill had special importance in Fulbe legend.50 It was associated
with supernatural manifestations, symbolized by the expected
appearance of an angel on a white horse who would bring good tidings
if carrying a white flag and bad tidings if carrying a red flag. The
sighting of a white bird or a vulture was also interpreted as
supernatural. Traditions from Morocco to the Nilotic Sudan held that
the advent of the Mahdi was to occur on a hill, which was sometimes
interpreted in the Caliphate as Bima Hill. Bormi, therefore,
attracted numerous Mahdist supporters, the most important of whom was
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Jibril Gaini, who responded to Hayatu's leadership and was appointed
Hayatu' s agent, amir al-.jaish.5 *
Jibril settled at Borrai in about 1885,52 from where he raided
pagan villages and quickly established himself as a military force in
Gombe Emirate. Caliph 'Umar ordered the emirates of the Borno
marches (Bauehi, Hadeija, Katagum, Jama'are, Misau and Gombe) to
destroy Bormi and end Jibril*s autonomy. A combined force laid seige
to one of Jibril's strongholds, the town of Bajoga, for six weeks in
early 1889 but without achieving a victory. A truce was reached
which left Jibril free to consolidate his control of much of Gombe
Dnirate. Jibril sent an escort to assist Hayatu in his abortive
attempt to flee Dikwa in 1898, and from then until 1902 Jibril
inherited the leadership of the ansar movement in the Caliphate. In
1902, the British stormed Bormi and exiled Jibril to Lokoja, where he
died, apparently in 1904.53 Bormi continued to attract Mahdist
supporters, and it was the site of another battle in 1903, at which
Caliph Muhammad Attahiru was finally defeated.S4 Even then, Mahdists
still looked to Bima Hill as a rallying point for insistence, and the
British found it necessary to build a fort on the hill in 1906, which
they did shortly after the destruction of Satiru.55
As this brief summary demonstrates, the Mahdist ansar were
concentrated in the eastern parts of the Sokoto Caliphate and were
largely associated with the careers of Hayatu, Jibril and Rabin, all
of whom were proponents and appointed agents of the Mahdist movement
of the Nilotic Sudan. A number of factors — the death of Mahdi
Muhammad Ahmad in 1884, the destruction of the Mahdist state in the
Nilotic Sudan in 1898, and the great distance between the Nile and
Lake Chad — resulted in the virtual autonomy of these western ansar.
While the geographical focus of the movement was northern Adamawa,
eastern Gombe and Borno (after its conquest in 1893), there was wide
support within the Caliphate. Hayatu came from Sokoto, and there was
a steady eastward drift of supporters from the central emirates.
Indeed many of those in Yola who opposed Hayatu claimed that there
was too many "Hausa" (as opposed to Fulbe) at Balda.56 Such charges
demonstrate that many people from the populous, central emirates had
settled at Balda. Ethnic considerations as such were of secondary
importance, of course. Anyone who accepted the claim that Muhammad
Ahmad was the Mahdi and that Hayatu was his appointed agent was
recognized as a loyal supporter.
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Anti-Colonial Mahdism
The colonial conquest forced many of those who rejected Hayatu's
pretensions and who did not recognize the Mahdiyya of Muhammad Ahmad
to reconsider their stand on the imminency of the Mahdi's arrival.
This introspection inevitably influenced the decisions of people as.
to whether or not they should accept colonial rule. For those who
acquiesed, the apologia of Muhammad al-Bukhari, the Waziri of Sokoto
(1886-1910), expresses well the agony of those who accepted
subjugation to the Christian incursion. In Risalat al-Wazir'ila al-
'ilm wa'1-tadabbur, he explained that the protection of Muslims
depended upon accommodation; emigration would turn the land into one
of unbelief. It was the duty of some Muslims to stay in office,
despite the apparent treason involved in accepting colonial
dictates.57 This rationalization justified the accession to office
of the colonial emirs and their subordinates, who soon found
themselves in direct conflict with the anti-colonial stance of many
Mahdists and their belief that the Mahdi was about to come, as
heralded by the colonial conquest.
Many of those who did not accept colonial rule chose emigration
(hi.jra) in anticipation of the Mahdi's arrival as an expression of
resistance. The leader in this new phase of Mahdist activism was
Caliph Attahiru, but many other Caliphate officials, such as Emir
Zubeiru of Yola and others who did not actually join Attahiru, became
anti-colonial Mahdists.58 Some office holders, such as the Emir of
Gwandu, who acceeded to office after the British conquest, wavered;
their sympathies were with those who resisted, and they too
interpreted their actions in the context of Mahdist beliefs.59 Many
commoners also flocked to Attahiru as he moved eastward through
Zamfara and Kano.60 To some extent the Caliph discouraged these
people. The difficulty of supplying enough food for the masses and
the many other people who wanted to join the hi.ira presented
logistical problems of serious proportions. More than a month after
the hijra. Resident Alder Burdon reported from Sokoto that "The
farmers are still trying to make their way to him [Attahiru] in the
belief that he would lead them to the Mahdi."a 1 In the end tens of
thousands of people appear to have joined the exodus.
In addition to the Caliphate aristocracy and their supporters,
there were two other groups of people who stood by Attahiru at the
fateful confrontation with the British at the second battle of Bormi
14
in March 1903. First, many followers of Hayatu and Jibril, under the
leadership of Imam Mahdi, drifted back to Bormi and were now ready to
Join cause with these new converts to active Mahdism.62 Second, a
group of Umarian refugees from the western Sudan had also come there,
perhaps because of the traditions surrounding Bima Hill.63 The
Umarians were the remnants of the emigration from Segu Tukulor, which
had been conquered by the French in 1893. Their association with the
Sokoto Caliphate was complicated. Al-hajj 'Urnar had had pretensions
to the caliphate upon the death of Muhammad Bello in 1838, and when
these claims were frustrated, he moved west and subsequently
initiated his own jihad. His Tijani affiliation and recognized
leader of the Tijaniyya in the western sudan placed him in opposition
to the predominant Qadiriyya of the Sokoto Caliphate. Segu Tukulor,
the creation of his jihad, became a Tijani state. The Umarians who
sought sanctuary in the Sokoto Caliphate after 1893 included the more
millenial elements of the Tijaniyya. Sokoto found it expedient to
welcome their immigration, but they were carefully watched. The
group settled in a number of places, Dallol Bosso (1896-98), Mai
Kulki, west of Sokoto (1898), Dankaba in Zanfara (1899), Gombe (1900-
01), Missau (1902), where upon a part of the group moved to Zindcr
and others moved onto Bormi.6 4
Despite the two Mahdist defeats at Bormi, Mahdist expectations
within the aristocracy did not fully subside. The emir of Gwandu,
installed by the British and hence not committed to the emigration of
Attahiru, is known to have harboured Mahdist beliefs, which is why he
allowed Dan Makafo to pass through Gwandu territory and why he
secretly encouraged the Satiru resistance.65 The emir paid for this
divided loyalty through the loss of his office one month after the
destruction of Satiru. He died shortly thereafter. Undoubtedly
other aristocrats secretly wondered about Mahdist prophesies. Dan
Makafo and Isa are known to have written letters to governing
officials in various parts of Caliphate territory,66 as Hayatu,
Jibril, Rabih and others had done before.
Although there were some aristocratic symphathies for continued
resistance, the predominant view among the ruling class had come to
accept colonial rule, whether British, German or French.67 With the
crises of 1906 came pledges of support to Lugard and his subordinates
from virtually every emirate in the British sphere, and the British
relied extensively on local military and police security.88 The
concentration of WAFF forces for the march on Satiru could not have
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occurred otherwise. French and German regimes had similar support
and relied on local troops, too.69
The accommodation of most of the Fulbe aristocracy with the
colonial regimes after the second battle of Bormi partially explains
why the Satiru uprising and other signs of Mahdism, particularly in
the western parts of Caliphate territory, had an undercurrent of
hostility to the aristocracy. But accommodation with colonialism
does not entirely explain the antipathy. In contrast to the ansar
movement, the Mahdist supporters of Dan Makafo at Kobkitanda and
Satiru did not include Fulbe (see below). There was already a strong
anti-aristocratic dimension to Dan Makafo's movement which
distinguished his brand of Mahdism both from the ansar supporters of
Hayatu and Jibril and from the emigrations of Attahiru and the
Umarians. While it would probably be inaccurate to categorize this
western Mahdism as anti-Fulbe and therefore based on ethnicity, it is
striking that there was relatively little support for the Satiru
community and its counterparts elsewhere among the Fulbe. There were
no Fulbe among the bodies of the dead Satirawa. It appears that the
reason for this can be explained by the revolutionary nature of
western Mahdism.
The expectations of the aristocracy were that the Mahdi would
eventually come, but usually the time for his appearance was in the
distant future. The hi.ira of Attahiru was an emigration out of
desperation, as if his flight was a symbolic act of resistance made
necessary by the belief in Mahdism but without a real expectation
that the time had come. While undoubtedly many of Attahiru's
supporters did join the hi.jra as true believers! Attahiru's actions
themselves have a hollow ring about them. Attahiru went through the
actions but did not really expect to find the Mahdi. The time for
his appearance was still in the future.
Revolutionary Mahdism
Revolutionary Mahdism can be distinguished from other forms of
Mahdism in that its proponents not only wanted to overthrow the
government but replace the ruling class entirely. Furthermore,
revolutionary Mahdism opposed slavery (see below), which was an
essential dimension of Caliphate economy and society.7© As was the
case with other Mahdists, revolutionary Mahdists believed that the
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time for the Mahdi's appearance was at hand, but the implications of
His appearance were different. Opposition to all established
government, including that of the Caliphate was a cornerstone of
revolutionary Mahdism. Because of the anti-aristocracy orientation
of revolutionary Mahdism, there was little reason to emigrate. Other
Mahdists were committed to emigration towards the east, in part
because of the expectation that that was from where the Mahdi would
come but in part because of the religious and class similarities
between Mahdist emigrants and the Fulbe aristocracy. The ansar and
Attahiru's supporters included many Fulbe, in contrast to
revolutionary Mahdists, and the Fulbe aristocracy as a whole tended
to associate emigration with Mahdism. As Hayatu's case demonstrates,
emigration was essential for disaffected aristocrats who maintained
political pretensions to accede to office. To remain in Sokoto would
have required a renunciation of such pretensions.
Many revolutionary Mahdists believed in the second coming of Isa
(Jesus), who would purge the world of unbelief and eliminate
oppresive government. Hence emigration was unnecessary. The
importance of the Isa tradition can be traced back to the followers
of Malam Hamza of Tsokuwa, a town in southeastern Kano Emirate,
although the tradition is found in classical Islam and was probably
widespread in the Caliphate before Hamza's time. A local cleric,
Hamza instructed his followers not to pay tax other than the zakka
(tithe). Tax officials (jakadu) were beaten and sent back to Kano
city. In 1848, Hamza fled to the Ningi Hills. His followers, who
claimed to be Isawa (followers of Isa), continued in revolt for the
rest of the century.71 Hamza's interpretation of Mahdism is unclear,
but the expectation that Isa would return continued to be an
important part of revolutionary Mahdist tradition.
Two stories collected at Lokoja in the early 1880s demonstrate
that the Isa tradition was widely believed. Reverend C. J. John of
the Church Missionary Society must have been surprised when he heard
"the news of the prophet Jesus which I heard from the mouth of the
people at Lokojah who were mussulraen or Mahommedans."
They said, He will come again at the resurrection of the
world, and wage war with Duggal or Daggal [the anti-Christ
of Mahdist tradition]. At that time the world will have
peace, because He will slay the wicked people, but the good
people will remain in the world.... Who is this Daggal?
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Daggal is a man who is doing all the wickedness in this
world, who in the day of the appearance of Jesus Christ
will make war with Him, but Jesus will slay him with all
his followers.~2
"Jesus" would come with the Mahdi. Other stories of Isa were also
common.7 3
Because it was not necessary to emigrate, revolutionary Mahdists
established communities in the heart of the Sokoto Caliphate, and
their agents openly directed their appeals to people in the emirate
captials. Isawa extremists were seized in Kano City in the 1850s and
impalled on the stake in the market, an action which demonstrates how
serious the Caliphate authorities took these clerics and how brazen
the clerics were.74 The location of the two major centres of
revolutionary Mahdism in the 1890s and first decade of colonial rule
further shows the intention of the extremists to remain close to the
centre of political power. Satiru was located a mere 20 km from
Sokoto, one of the twin capitals of the Caliphate,"75 while Kabkitanda
was 50 km west of Gwandu, the other capital.
Revolutionary Mahdism was a concern of Sokoto officials in the
nineteenth century,.at least since c. 1848 and Hamza's withdrawal to
the Ningi hills.76 Despite Uthman dan Fodio's writings on Mahdism,
in which he adamently denied being the Mahdi, and other attempts
directed at curtailing popular outbursts of Mahdist expression and at
discouraging people from emigrating eastward, there were periodic
Mahdist outbursts.
The establishment of the Mahdist community at Satiru in about
1894 is an example of such extreme forms of Mahdism. Its inhabitants
were poor clerics and their followers who came from the capital
districts of Sokoto and Gwandu. The origins of these clerics is
instructive of the hostility of the community to established
authority. Malam Siba, who founded Satiru, came from Gindi, near
Jega, but was of Nupe origin, and Nupe had been racked by civil war
caused by the .jihad through the 1850s; Siba may well have been a
slave or the son of slaves. A second cleric, Maihafo, who was to
declare himself Mahdi in 1904, was of Gobir origin, the country which
Uthman dan Fodio had forced into subjugation; the destruction of the
Gobir capital, Alkalawa, was one of the greatest victories of the
.jihad. A third cleric, Malam Bawa was from Bakura in Zamfara.
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Zamfara had been in revolt against Sokoto on several occasions in the
nineteenth century and was almost always dangerous country for
merchants and other travellers. None of these clerics was Fulbe.7 7
Their antipathy to the caliphate is perhaps best summarized in
the alleged statement of Siba:
that he was fed up with the exactions of the
ruling class and that he was not going to obey the
instructions of anyone anymore... [but instead] was
going to set up a new great regime.78
Satiru did not pay taxes or contribute corvee labor to Sokoto either
before or after the British conquest. Located between four great
fiefs, Danchadi, Dange, Shuni and Bodinga, it was a refuge for
escaped slaves and other discontented elements. Its relations with
its four neighbouring towns was far from cordial, and in the course
of the revolt both Dange and Danchadi were sacked and burned.79
The introduction of the colonial regime intensified the appeal
of revolutionary Mahdism. The principal political opponent was the
Caliphte government, and the challenge to the colonial regimes,
whether French, British or German, was an extension of this
revolutionary position. The actions of Caliphate officials who
cooperated with the colonial state only demonstrated further to the
radical Mahdists why the government had to be overthrown.
Within a year or two of 1900, Mahdist agents were active in
Nupe, Kontagora, Sokoto, Gwandu and further west as far as Gonja,
which was outside the Caliphate but within its economic and religious
sphere of influence.fi ° It is also likely that Mahdist agents in
Bauchi addressed similar undercurrents of discontent which do not
appear to be associated with the ansar movement nor the anti-colonial
Mahdism of the aristocracy. And Mahdist agents continued to operate
in the areas where the ansar had been powerful — in Gombe and
northern Adamawa.
The colonial authorities, often acting through caliphate
officials, made numerous arrests, but new leaders kept emerging.
British officials, at least, welcomed the opportunity to let the
Islamic courts handle these cases. Such devolution of responsibility
was part of their perceptions of the kind of "indirect rule" which
19
made sense in a context in which the colonial staff was, and was
certainly always to be, undermanned. In keeping with the millenial
nature of the radical Mahdist movement, prophesies kept changing to
take account of political developments, but, nonetheless, a pattern
is clear in these teachings. A Mahdi was to come from the east.
Predictions of the appearance of the Mahdi increased in their
frequency, reaching a peak in 1906. There would be a great
conflagration at the time of the Id el-Kabir, the end of the month of
Ramadan, February 5, 1906. Many expected the Mahdi to be named Musa,
and some believed that he would come with his son, Isa (Jesus). All
authority would be overthrown, both colonial and aristocratic.
The anti-colonial orientation of these Mahdist preachings was
made clear well before Attahiru's hijra. One Mahdist poet, in
response to the West African Frontier Force march on Zaria in 1901,
equated the colonialists with Gog and Magog, the eternal enemies'of
the Mahdi:
Gog and Magog are coming, they approach,"
They are small people, with big ears,
They are those who cause destruction at the ends of
the earth,
When they approach a town, its crops will not
sprout....
The fertility of the world will be taken away,
The place that once gave seventy bushels will not
give seven,
Anti-Christ is coming,
He will come and have authority over the world.
The Mahdi and Jesus, they are coming
In order to straighten out the tangle [of the
world],si
The reference to the Mahdi and Jesus (Isa) is particularly
instructive, since Isa had been associated with revolutionary Mahdism
since the revolt of Hamza in Kano Emirate in 1848 and was to reappear
in the uprising at Satiru in 1906. The "Anti-Christ" was none other
than the "Daggal" of earlier teachings.
In 1902, Malam Mai Zanna responded to the British occupation of
Bida by calling for the expulsion of the British and the Emir. It is
reported that Mai Zanna claimed to be the Mahdi, but such reports
1 ;•
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must be treated with caution. Nonetheless, he
collected numerous followers from the neighbouring
villages of Bida and the lower classes in the town. This
rabble was, however, unprepared for any action and the
ringleaders were surprised and quietly arrested by the
Emir's dogarai [police]. The "Mahdi" was tried and
sentenced by the Native Court to six months' imprisonment
in the town dungeon and the followers were fined 25 bags of
cowries each.82
The charge that Mai Zanna was of "low class" and the references to
"rabble" suggest that slaves and poor farmers were his principal
supporters and that the movement had no standing with the
aristocracy. Note that this is a sign of revolutionary Mahdism and
that hostility was directed against both the British and the Bida
aristocracy. It is more likely that Mai Zanna only declared himself
a Mahdist, as in other cases, rather than actually claiming to be the
Mahdi.
In January 1904, Malam Maikaho proclaimed himself Mahdi at
Satiru. The authorities quickly summoned him to Sokoto and tried him
for sedition.83 At his trial he claimed that he was only a Mahdi of
fanning, not a Mahdi of war.84 The significance of this distinction
is not clear, and at this time, there is no evidence for a connection
between Satiru and Kobkitanda. As C.W.J. Orr, Acting Resident of
Sokoto, reported to Lugard on February 29th,
During the month the Serikin Mussulmin reported that a
Mallam was endeavouring to set himself up as a Mahdi in the
south of the Province to induce the people to rise against
the Whiteman, and that had sent messages to that effect
to the Serikin Kiawa of Kaura [Namoda]. The man was
arrested and is now in custody in Sokoto, but is ill, so
that investigation is delayed temporarily. The matter will
be thoroughly gone into and the Mallam tried in the Native
Court, but I have told the Serikin Mussulmin that he is to
keep me informed and will not pass any sentence without
previous reference to me for the consideration and
information of your Excellency. I do not look upon the
matter as serious, but it bears close watching.85
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Orr's report establishes that Maikaho died on or shortly after 29
February, and while foul play is not indicated in the documents it is
certainly likely that he was killed, considering Sokoto fears of
Mahdism in the light of the disaster at Bormi the previous year.
Lugard's marginal note on Orr's report approved of a trial before the
Islamic (Native) court, "if they will punish adequately."86
Maikaho's supporters were released "after tatting an oath on the Koran
to keep the peace."87 Mahdi Maikaho's son, Hassami, became the new
headman at Satiru, and when he died in the summer of 1905, another
son, Isa, became headman.88 Saybu Dan Makafo was later to make much
of Isa's name, for in Mahdist eschotology, Isa was to be the
successor to the Mahdi.
Although the British were ignorant of developments at Satiru, it
is possible to suggest a partial reconstruction of the progressive
radicalization of the community. The Mahdists continued to command
some local support at least. The citizenry of neighboring towns and
villages came to Satiru to celebrate the Muslim festivals, and some
Muslims in the area had studied under Isa's father" and had accepted
his Mahdist pretensions.89 Hassami apparently respected the 1904
order of the Sarkin Musulmi that revolutinary Mahdism be curtailed,
presumably under the threat that a local fiefholder, the Sarkin Keffi
of Danchadi, would send dogarai (police) to break up the town if
militant Mahdism was being preached. The Sarkin Keffi was informed
when Hassami died in the summer of 1905 and apparently approved the
succession of Isa. By this time, however, Satiru once again was
beyond control. The Sarkin Keffi had not collected taxes, and after
the rebellion
he confessed that he was afraid to do so. He knew it
[SatiruJ as a gathering of fanatical Malams, a hotbed of
disaffection, and he neither took action nor made any
report.9 °
The accession of Isa appears to have marked a shift towards
militancy, but only when Saybu Dan Makafo arrived at the end of
January 1906 was an uprising a certainty.
Saybu Dan Makafo was spreading Mahdist doctines in Zaberma, Say
and Karma, perhaps as early as 1901 but with increased intensity by
1905.91 Kobkitanda, along with Sambera, Tidirka, Toka, and Kofadey,
was founded in 1902-3 as a place of refuge for those in the Niger
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valley who opposed both the French conquest and aristocratic
cooperation with the French, as represented by the succession of Awta
as Zarmakoy at Doso. They were ideally located to attract adherents
and to spread propaganda. From his base at Kobkitanda, Saybu sent
emissaries throughout a wide area and received delegations from the
Tuareg and others. By September 1905, Saybu's agents were known to
have been at Anzuru, Sonay, Torodi and other places (Dokimana and
Boki in the Emirate of Say). He had visited Karma, among other
places, was recognized as a devote Mahdist at least 400 km from
Kobkitanda. Itinerant clerics on their way to and from the middle
Volta basin, one of the most heavily travelled commercial routes at
the time, stopped there. One such visiting cleric from Kano, Malam
Danba, came to the attention of French officials and probably to the
British officials in the Gold Coast as well. Danba was predicting
the imminent arrival of the Mahdi.9 2 He came via Sokoto and "was
said to be preaching a holy war against Europeans."93 The rapidity
with which Saybu extended his influence and the presence of clerics
like Danba suggest that there was already a revolutionary Mahdist
network well established by 1905, but this is circumstantial.
Mahdist activity accelerated in early 1906. In Kontagora, a
Mahdist cleric "drew attention to the impending end of British rule
and exhorted people to stop paying taxes to the British
administration."94 Other agents were operating at Jebba and Yelwa.95
Another Mahdist agent, Malam Mai Layu, came to the notice of the
authorities just after the destruction of Satiru in March. Mai Layu
had gathered a following, principally from Raba in Zamfara. By March
10, when his activities were first reported, he was building a
village in the bush at a place called Dajin Gundumi.96 Burdon
considered Mai Layu potentially more dangerous than the Satiru
community. He believed that Mai Layu was a rival to Dan Makafo, but
this may have been wishful thinking. Taking no chances, Mai Layu was
detained by the Sarkin Musulmi on 22 March.97 Finally the
whereabouts of Malam Siba, one of the leaders at Satiru, is unknown.
He left Satiru after the initial encounter with Hillary's troops on
February 14th,98 but the reason for his departure and his destination
are unclear. Most likely, he was an emissary seeking to inform
supporters of events at Satiru, perhaps urging other uprisings and
recruiting adherents.
In Bauchi, Resident 0. Howard reported the appearance of Mahdist
agents in February. Ali, an "incipient Mahdi [was] in the old centre
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of fanaticism near Burmi [Bormi]," that is at Bima Hill. Ali
preached "the extermination of all infidels and declared that he was
the precursor of the Mahdi."99 Another cleric, Alhaji Malle, a
follower of Jibril Gaini, was also arrested, tried in the Bauchi
Native Court and hanged. Two other agents escaped; one headed for
Wadai and the East; the other went to Mandara in German territory,
where he may have joined the Mahdist resistance there.100 The fate
of yet another Mahdist, an Arab named Alhaji Ishaq, is not known but
was apparently prevented from further teaching.i°1 Resident Howard
of Bauchi reported on February 28th that there had been predictions
of the arrival of the Mahdi "within a month".102 These predictions
may well have referred to the Id el-Kabir of February 5th, but the
information is simply inclusive to draw a connection with the events
at Satiru.
The activities of these Mahdist agents in Bauchi and Gombe drew
their inspiration from the tradition of the ansar movement and the
hi.ira of Attahiru and do not appear to have been connected with the
revolutionary Mahdism of Satiru and Kobkitanda. Nonetheless, these
agents, too, were anti-colonial and hence had many similarities with
the revolutionary Mahdists in Sokoto and Gwandu. Still, there is no
direct evidence that the protagonists were in contact. It appears
that the western and eastern manifestations of Mahdism were distinct.
Bima Hill was still a prominent attraction, and while there were
other elements than Fulbe in the eastern movement, the aristocracy
was well represented. Mahdism had been transformed in the context of
the colonial occupation into popular resistance which was rapidly
changing the loyalties of some of the aristocracy, but a similar
phenomenon had charactrized Hayatu*s movement in the 1880s and 1890s.
It is not possible to conclude how far the process of alienation
among the aristocracy had progressed, although the use of Islamic
Courts to try Mahdists must have accelerated the process.
Savbu Dan Makafo
Kimba Idrissa has claimed,103 and we believe rightly, that the
Mahdist uprisings at Kobkitanda, Satiru, and Karma were under the
leadership of Saybu Dan Makafo, the nearly-blind cleric who was
executed after the Satiru massacre. The French thought Saybu to be
about thirty years old in 1906; oral traditions remember him being
about forty.104 According to French reports, he had the gift of
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ventriloquism which may help explain his fame as a magician.105 He
reportedly had Tijani connections,106 but the significance of this is
unclear, since he was an avowed Mahdist and self proclaimed agent of
the Mahdi. As Idrissa has noted, Dan Makafo was considered a wali, a
saint.""
There is no evidence for a direct connection with the Mahdists
arrested by the British in Nupe in 1901 or Kontagora in 1906, but the
teachings are too much alike to discount the possibility of a
connection. Dan Makafo was certainly in touch with and even
instructing agents in the Niger valley to the immediate north of
Kontagora; he seems to have known about the Satiru community, where
he eventually fled, and his agents were active in northern Borgu, to
the immediate west of Kontagora, in Say and other emirates along the
Niger River. It is probable, moreover, that the Mahdist agent, Musa,
arrested in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast was also
another associate. If the estimate of Saybu's age (30-40) is
correct, he was far too young to be the principal Mahdist agent of
his day. He was one of many and seized the initiative in 1905 to
organize a major uprising for the end of Ramadan in early February
1906.
Dan Makafo1s call for a revolt was unequivical. It was to occur
on the Id el-Kabir, the festival at the end of Ramadan, in early
February 1906 (the Id was in fact on 5 February).108 At that time
the Mahdi, named Musa, would arrive from the east. In his early
preachings there is no known mention of Isa, but he stressed this
feature of revolutionary Mahdism once he reached Satiru. He
instructed his supporters not to pay tax or contribute corvee labor.
They were not to obey local officials who supported the colonial
regime. A great Muslim army would liberate the country from the
Christian occupation. To protect his followers, he devised numerous
supernatural preparations:
A cet effet, il preparait des charmes magiques
ou se melent animisme et islam. II s'agirait d'une
boisson, une mixture a base de plantes (racines ou
feuilles) et de versets coraniques. Les partisans
le buvait afin de se rendre invulnerables aux fusils
(ou que les balles dirigees sur eux se transforment
en eau), developper leur combativite et leur
courage.l° 9
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The belief that bullets would turn to water perhaps arose because the
maxim machine gun was known in Hausa as bindigan ruwa (water-gun) in
recognition that the barrel of the gun required a jacket filled with
water to cool it. If so, it was a tragic misunderstanding, as events
demonstrated.
Saybu began training his followers at Kobkitanda in late 1905,
if not earlier. Letters were sent to officials who supported the
colonial regime calling upon them to join the movement. His envoys
were particularly active in the region of Say and Karma. Anawar, the
chief of the Anzuru Tuareg, even came to Kobkitanda to enquire about
the planned revolt.110 Other Tuareg waited to see how the revolt
would go. In the end they did not participate, but the French feared
that they would.
The uprising at Satiru was also to begin on the Id el-Kabir,
February 5th, but it was postponed.111 British reports later
credited the delay to strategy; Resident Burdon was scheduled to go
on leave, and the Satirawa are said to have been waiting for his
departure. The Satiru attack on the WAFF detachment under Acting
Resident Hillary occurred February 14th, nine days after the Id el-
Kabir and two (???) days after Burdon had left. Reports indicated
that Isa was to announce a jihad at the Friday prayer, 16 February,
two days after the defeat of Hillary's expedition, and raise a green
flag. Whether or not this was formally done is not known; it was the
day of Isa's death.112
There may have been some truth in this theory, but a far more
significant reason for delay appears to have related to a dispute
within the Mahdist community over the timing of the revolt, and
indeed perhaps whether or not a revolt was wise. There was a
serious incident at Tsomau, a neighbouring town where many Mahdists
lived, on February 13 because the Tsomau residents had refused to
come to Satiru for the Id festival. Malam Yahaya, twelve other
townsmen and one woman were killed.113 In previous years the Tsomau
Mahdists had come to Satiru for the Ramadan ceremonies. Yahaya's
teacher had been Mahdi Maikafo, Isa's father, and Isa and Yahaya were
related by marriage. Yahaya refused to recognize Isa's leadership
and particularly the claim that Isa was the successor to the Mahdi,
as in Mahdist tradition. Johnston's compilation of Satiru traditions
quotes Yahaya as saying: "How can we believe that you are the Prophet
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Jesus...when we have known you ever since we were all children?"114
Subsequent attacks on neighbouring communities by the Satirawa
can be explained in the same way. Danchadi was burned on March 6th
and Dange on March 8th. Burdon reported that "all the thickly
populated country between these two was devastated."115 The Satirawa
attempted to intimidate reluctant Mahdist sympathizers into joining
the revolt, and they specifically attacked slave plantations,
apparently to liberate slaves.116 Among the places burned between 16
February and early March were Runjin Kwarai, Runjin Gawa, Rudu
Makera, Jaredi, Dandin Mane, Zangalawa, Bunazawa, Hausawan Maiwa, and
Kindiru. The towns of Shuni, Bodinga and Sifawa were evacuated.117
It should be noted that run.ii (rinji) signifies "plantation." Many
of the other settlements appear to have been slave estates, too.118
The British were unaware of the uprising in French territory at
this time, and they did not know the significance of the Id el-Kabir,
even though Malam Isa and Dan Makafo had sent letters to Caliphate
officials calling on them to join the revolt. Furthermore, Mallam,
son of the emir of Gwandu, was reported to have enquired whether or
not a revolt had begun the day before the Id festival, and was told
by one of his followers that the revolt would begin the next day. I19
When Resident Burdon left Sokoto on leave, therefore, the British
were remarkably ignorant of what was taking place, but many people
were expecting serious trouble. Hillary and the WAFF detachment did
not exactly walk into a trap, but they certainly misjudged the
situation.
A major difference between the actions of these Mahdists and the
hi.ira of Attahiru should be noted. The revolutionary Mahdists wanted
to stay and fight. Attahiru did not want to fight but was forced
into it. Furthermore, there were no Fulbe among the supporters at
Satiru and Kobkitanda. Attahiru had Fulbe support, which was also in
the tradition of the ansar Mahdists. Both Hayatu and Jibril were
Fulbe.
Another important feature of the Mahdist uprising was the role
of Dan Makafo. Because of his poor sight - makafo means "blindman" -
he probably did not have the command of the written word which was
usual for Muslim clerics. Rather than base his authority on the
tradition of scholarship, he relied on mysticism alone. He dispensed
amulets and encouraged belief in supernatural protection from
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bullets. For the Satirawa, this emphasis was tragic. Dan Makafo
taught that the bullets of the enemy would turn to water. Even
though the Satirawa captured a maxim machine gun and other firearms
in the first encounter with the WAFF, these weapons were never used.
Ironically, lack of water prevented the captured maxim gun from being
put into action. Its jacket, through which water circulated to cool
the hot gun barrel, had been ruptured during the first battle.
Instead, the Satirawa charged the WAFF square, even though they had
been exposed to the devastating impact of modern weaponry. The
bullets did not become water.
The Social Origins of Revolutionary Mahdism
Revolutionary Mahdism appealed to four groups: fugitive slaves,
subject populations, displaced peasants seeking to escape the
exactions of the colonial conquest, and radical clerics. This
interpretation is consistent with the conclusions of both Mohammad
and Idrissa. According to Mohajnmad, "peasants, slaves and petty
malams saw the new situation [of colonial rule] as a continuation of
their struggle against oppression and exactions which they had been
waging against the Sokoto Caliphate."120 Idrissa concludes that
were no Fulbe pastoralists, Caliphate aristocrats, merchants, or
other wealthy commoners among the rebels.121 The first villages near
Kobkitanda were founded in the 1890s, and their population swelled
with the arrival of people seeking to avoid colonial labour and
taxation. Satiru, located between four fiefs, never paid taxes, and
a large proportion of its population was fugitive slaves.
The nature of the source material makes it difficult to discuss
the social origins of the rebels.122 It is clear that fugitive
slaves were a major factor in the revolt, but British colonial
reports attempted to hide the slavery issue as much as possible.
French reports are largely silent on the subject of slavery. Oral
data supplement the available written reports on this issue for
Satiru but not for Kobkitanda. *23 Nonetheless the available evidence
indicates clearly how important social factors were in the revolt, at
least in the western portions of the caliphate.
In his report of 21 February 1906, Burdon stated: "As far as I
can learn the adherents who at one time flocked to it [the Satiru
cause] were nearly all run away slaves."124 Lugard accepted this
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report and relayed the information to the Colonial Office that the
Satirawa were "mostly fugitive slaves, and I suspose some outlaws
from French territory," a reference to Dan Makafo and his
followers.125 In his report of Marth 7th, Lugard still subscribed to
this theory: "it appears that the rising was instigated by an outlaw
from French territory named Dan Makafo, who gathered together a band
of malcontents and runaway slaves, and forced Malam Isa, the son of a
man who had previously [in 1904] declared himself Mahdi to head the
rising."126 On the basis of oral data, Mohammad confirms these
reports; the Mahdist clerics "encouraged the emigration of slaves
to Satiru."127 One of the reasons why slaves appear to have flocked
to Satiru was because the Satirawa are remembered as having abolished
slavery. According to Maidamma Mai Zari, Dutsen Assada ward, Sokoto,
"the leaders of Satiru abolished slavery and as a consequence of
which slaves flocked to them. The freedom of these fugitives was
effectively and strenuously guarded." 12S
The information on Kobkitanda is more sketchy and includes no
reference to fugitive slaves. The inhabitants of the neighbouring
villages which were part of this resistance were largely Zaberma.
Those at Kobkitanda were mostly from Zigi. People from Doso had
founded Sambera, but others came from Darey and Fankasa. There do
not appear to have been any Fulbe in these communities. Dan Makafo
is reputed to have been the son of a Zaberma noble - of what rank or
significance is not known. The Zaberma were in revolt against the
Sokoto Caliphate for much of the nineteenth century anyway,129 and
the population could well have included fugitive slaves. Only
further research can determine this. There were appeals to the
population of Say, which would have included a call to slaves, to
join the revolt. Say had a heavy concentration of slaves, many of
whom were of Zaberma origin, so that the ethnic and class dimensions
of Mahdism would have been present but blurred. And Say did not
rise.
The major grievance of Kobkitanda Mahdists, according to
Idrissa, was the severity of the colonial conquest, in which the
riverine communities had been expected to provide the labour and food
for the march on the desert and Chad. In the context of Caliphate
society, nonetheless, the Zaberma were definitely not part of the
aristocracy or merchant class, and those Zaberma in the bush
communities between Dallol Bosso and Dallol Mawri were the lower
orders of Zaberma society. It would be surprising if fugitive slaves
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had not been present.
The lowly origins of revolutionary Mahdists was also evident in
Nupe in 1902. As has been noted above, Mai Zanna's supporters were
considered to be the lower classes - "rabble" - and probably included
fugitive slaves, considering the size of the slave population in the
Bida area and extent to which slaves ran away from there masters
there.130 Specific mention of fugitive slaves is lacking, however.
The extent to which fugitive slaves were a problem in the early
years of colonial rule has been examined elsewhere.131 Slaves began
to leave their masters by the late 1890s. As the conquest proceeded
north, the fugitive crisis moved with it. By 1906 slaves were still
running away, although by then the alliance between the new colonial
regime and the caliphate aristocracy had begun to take hold.
Controlling slaves was high on the agenda of this alliance. The fact
that fugitives slaves were a major component of revolutionary Mahdism
comes as no surprise, therefore.
An analysis of the ethnic composition of the revolutionary
Mahdists at Satiru further confirms the class basis of the revolt.
There were no Fulbe among the revolutionary Mahdists. Zabenna were
the dominant ethnic group at Kobkitanda and Karma and along the Niger
valley. Hausa predominated at Satiru. The fact that Dan Makafo
could move easily between the two indicates that the Zabenna and
Hausa supporters of revolutionary Mahdism faced a common enemy, the
upper classes of the Caliphate and their new allies, the colonial
regimes. In the context of the Caliphate, Hausa was associated with
the peasantry and slaves, Fulbe with the aristocracy. Zabenna were
classified as "protected people," when not in revolt. From a Fulbe
perspective, both were Habe. In fact the relationship between class
and ethnicity was much more complicated. Many*Fulbe were not
aristocrats, and some Hausa were wealthy merchants. The more
important Muslim clerics, the ulema, were closely associated with
both, often being of the same families and intermarrying. Wealthy
merchants and aristocrats did not marry, however.132
Resident Burdon grasped the significance of the ethnic dimension
in his report to Lugard:
Satiru was a Hausa village and only Hausas or their kindred
races have joined them. All the faces on the battlefield
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had Gobir, Kebbi, Zanfara, Katsena and other such tribal
marks. Not a single Fulani talaka [commoner] joined
them.*33
Mohammed, on the basis of oral sources, presents a similar picture,
with some additions. The ethnic groups included Zamfarawa, Gobirawa,
Gimbanawa, Kabawa (Kebbi), Azbinawa (Azben), Arawa (Arewa), and
Katsinawa:
There might have been some non-Habe and non-Muslims among
the Satirawa since quite a number of the slaves owned by
the Sarakuna [i.e., title-holders] and Atta.i irai [wealthy
merchants] were from other societies.134
It is significant that other non-Hausa identities are not remembered,
despite the presence of fugitive slaves. By staying to fight,
fugitive slaves in effect had renounced their other loyalties and
were fighting as Hausa.
By contrast, the supporters of the 1906 Mahdist risings in
Garoua and Maroua were Fulbe, the descendents of Muslims who had
emigrated from the central emirates in the late nineteenth century,
and Mahdists who come from the east with Rabin. There is no evidence
that fugitive slaves joined the revolts or that local, subject
populations of the Caliphate were involved. The ansar movement
continued to be associated with the Fulbe and the aristocracy, to be
sure those portions of the aristocracy which were not in power but
Fulbe nonetheless.
Colonial Policy and the Mahdist Revolts
In Dusgate's assessent, the March 10th battle at Satiru "was the
most bloodthirsty expedition in the history of British military
operations in Northern Nigeria."135 Adeleye has concluded that
British policy was characterized by "misjudgements, panic and
miscalculations," for which the British took "revenge-"136 Margery
Perham, in her biography of Lugard, has noted that
vengence, it must be admitted, was what most of the white
men in Northern Nigeria wanted [after the initial loss at
Satiru], and with them in this were those Fulani leaders
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who had accepted their rule.... It was a terrible
vengence, more terrible than Lujgard knew at the time.137
Just how "terrible" came out in subsequent reports which were kept
secret.
Lugard's son and William Wallace, Acting High Commissioner after
Lugard was transferred to Hong Kong later in 1906, carried out an
investigation in response to enquiries from Walter Miller, the C.M.S.
missionary in Zaria. They found that the "killing was very free, not
to say slaughter"(italics in original); "they killed every living
thing before them" so that the fields were "running with blood,"
while the "splitting of mallams on a stake" and the "cutting off the
breasts of women" were typical atrocities.138
Neither Lugard, Jr. nor Wallace wanted "to wash such very dirty
linen in public in view of our attitude re Congo atrocities." Lord
Lugard and the Colonial Office concurred, and fortunately for the
cover-up, Walter Miller did, too,139 although an irate Winston
Churchill in the Colonial Office asked the embarassing questions
behind the scenes:
How does this "extermination" of an "aljnost unarmed rabble"
numbering 2000 compre with the execution of 12 Kaffirs in
Natal after trial & conviction for murder? How long is
this sort of thing going to escape Parliamentary attention,
& what will happen when it attracts it? I confess I do not
at all understand what our position is, or with what face
we can put pressure on the Govt. of Natal, while these sort
of things are done under our direct authority.*40
Churchill was referring to case of heavy-handed justice in South
Africa and the uproar in England at the time. "His comparison was
similar to Lugard, Jr.'s reference to the sanctimonous British
position with respect to Belgian atrocities in the Congo.
How much did Lugard know? Is Perham correct that he was not
fully informed but that things were worse than he knew? She claims
that when he heard of the Sokoto executions, he ordered them stopped:
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The executions had been carried out without his
confirmation; he at once stopped them. But there can be
no doubt that he had intended that the retribution should
be complete. '41
In fact Lugard very clearly ordered the affair,
his wife the day before the massacre:
As he wrote home to
There ought to be no doubt at all as to the result. They
should annihilate them, and it is necessary for the
recovery of our prestige that the victory be a signal
one.(italics in original)142
After the battle, he wrote again to his wife: "I fear the slaughter
of these poor wretches has been terrible - but, in the face of the
death of three British officers I could hardly order them to threat
them with mercy, and had to leave it to those on the spot."143 In
short, Lugard knew full well what had happened, and the subsequent
correspondence with his brother, Wallace, Miller, and Strachan were
part of a deliberate cover-up. Perham's claim, despite the fact that
she also quotes the correspondence between Lugard and his wife,
indicates that she was a later party to the cover-up.
Given the extent of the Mahdist uprisings, crossing the colonial
boundaries of three European regimes and threatening to spread
through the heartlands of British Northern Nigeria, Lugard made the
tactical, and probably wise, decision from an imperial perspective to
set a bloody example. He had only learned that the uprising at
Satiru was a continuation of the revolt in French Niger after Hillary
expedition. The French and British regimes communicated over the
unrest, and the French offered assistance to the British after the
initial debacle at Satiru. Despite the fact that the revolt crossed
the border, the British still chose to act alone, and events proved
that they had the resources to crush the revolt without French '
assistance. Lugard was less sure how far the unrest might spread in
British territory. He believed that the Mahdist disturbances in
Bauchi and Gombe "would appear entirely unconnected with the Sokoto
disturbance [at Satiru],"14* but there was considerable worry over
other these and other events. Mai Layu was rounded up without
difficulty, which confirmed Lugard's belief that most officials had
decided to support the British.143 While it appeared that the revolt
was spreading to Zamfara at the time of the final assault on Satiru,
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Lugard chose to interpret Mai Layu's activities in terms of rivalry
to the Satiru leadership rather than as a continuation of the Satiru
revolt. As with the other revolutinary Mahdists, however, Mai Layu's
Zamfara followers were non-Fulbe.
Similarly, Lugard, in consultation with Resident Howard in
Bauchi, determined that the Mahdist leaders there were not associated
with the Satiru rising. Nonetheless, they were treated just as
harshly as if they had been. And to consolidate British control and
undermine Mahdism, Bima Hill was occupied and a fort constructed in
late April.
The more serious problem for the British was the slavery issue.
As we have argued elsewhere,146 Lugard's policies toward slavery were
a crucial aspect of the establishment of indirect rule. The reform
of slavery was essential but had to be done so as not to alienate the
slave holders. With respect to revolutionary Mahdism, it was
essential to downplay the significance of fugitive slaves. The
Colonial Office, in the first instance, followed by Lugard, attempted
to shift attention to other factors. While slavery was clearly
mentioned as a contributing cause to the revolt in early reports, the
issue was deliberately removed from later reports. Lugard's initial
cable stated clearly: "The rebels are outlaw fugitive slaves."147
The Colonial Office announcement of the revolt stated something quite
different: "The rebels are outlaw fugitives." A marginal note next
to Lugard's telegram indicated how the incident was to be handled:
"Better say nothing of slaves."148 If there had a cover-up with
respect to the severity of the repression, there was equally one with
respect to slavery. And the reasons were interrelated. The
annihilation of the Satirawa was a lesson to slaves as well as the
aristocracy. It demonstrated to the slave population that the
slavery reforms were to be enforced, and it cemented the alliance
with the aristocracy. The destruction of Satiru was the last time
the British called upon Caliphate troop levies*to quell a disorder.
Given the number of fugitive slaves at Satiru and the extent of
violence perpetrated by those troops, the message to slaves and
masters alike elsewhere must have been particularly clear.149
Mahdist unrest did subside thereafter. An incident at Ilorin in
the third quarter of 1911 served to confirm the collapse of the
Mahdist movement. A 14 year old boy who claimed to be the Mahdi was
being carried around the town on the shoulders of a man. As Resident
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P. M. Dwyer reported,
I sent for the man and the boy in question and treated them
with ridicule at the same time informing them that I had
plenty of room in my prison and that in they would go
should I hear of any more such nonsense. Owing to the fact
that there is a tradition in Illorin that the coming
Mahdi is a boy about same age..., the Emir was foolish
enough to grant them an interview and I believe a small sum
of money.150
Mahdism would appear again at Dumbulwa in 1922-23, but as Saeed and
Ubah have shown, there was really no threat to the colonial regime.
Nonetheless, the Mahdist leader, Shaikh Sa'id, son of Hayatu, was
arrested. This time the British did over-react, and in any case the
Dumbulwa Mahdists derived from the ansar, not revolutionary
Mahdists.151
1. This paper is part of a larger project on the economic and
social impact of the colonial conquest on the Sokoto Caliphate.
2. Ironically, Ponty, Lt-Gov of French West Africa,
commented on the apparent disunity of the Mahdists:
"Fortunately for us these events have once again proved that
when left to themselves the natives are incapable of the
combination and union necessary to carry out a preconceived
plan. Otherwise the situation might been very serious." Ponty
failed to note that Germans, British and French did not
cooperate in crushing the insurrections. They actively
independently. Offers of French assistance to the British were
refused, and there seems to have been only minimal
consultation between the European powers, even after the
revolts were crushed. See the extract of Ponty's report on the
revolts in Niger, which were forwarded to the Colonial Office
by C. F. Cromie, British Consul-General in Dakar on 10
September 1906, five months after the destruction of Satiru,
No. 34903 of 18 September 1906, CO 446/57, Public Record
Office (hereafter PRO).
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3. For a listing of the emirates of the Caliphate, see Yusufu Usman,
"The Transformation of Political Communities: Some Notes on a
Significant Dimension of the Sokoto Jihad," in Usman, ed., Studies in
the History of the Sokoto Caliphate (Lagos, 1979), 55. Usman lists
thirty emirates, including Gwandu, but Gwandu was really a capital
district. For the sub-emirates of Adamawa (Fombina), see Abubakar
Sa'ad, The Lamibe of Fombina (Zaria, 1977), 115-16. It should be
noted that of the fifteen sub-emirates, four were larger than many of
the emirates in the rest of the Caliphate; these were Banyo,
Ngaundere, Ray-Buba, and Tibati. For the conquest of th Caliphate,
see Richard H. Dusgate, The Conquest of Northern Nigeria (London,
1985); D. J. M. Muffet, Concerning Brave Captains. A History of
Lord Lugard's Conquest of Hausaland (London, 1964); Mahmud Madiabbo
Tukur, The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto
Caliphate (Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, Ahmadu Bello University, 1979);
Peter Kazenga Tibenderana, The Administration of Sokoto, Gwandu and
Argungu Emirates under Britsh Rule, 1900-1946 (Ph.D. thesis,
unpublished, University of Ibadan, 1974); R. A. Adeleye, Power and
Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906 (New York, 1971).
4. The discussion of the revolt in French Niger relies on
Kimba Idrissa, Gueres et societes. Les populations du "Niger"
occidental au XIXe siecle et leurs reactions face a la
colonisation (1896-1906) (Niamey, 1981).
5. Idrissa, Guerres et societes, 150-51.
6. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 148, 152-53; Ponty, "Exract.
7. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 155-170.
8. Ponty, "Extract."
9. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 156, 176-77.
10. The scholarly literture on Satiru is extensive; see R. A.
Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern
Nigeria: Satiru 1906," Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria. 6,2 (1972), 193-214; Abubakar Sokoto Mohammed, A
Social Interpretation of the Satiru Revolt of c. 1894-1906
(M.Sc. thesis, unpublished, Ahmadu Bello University, 1983);
36
Muhammad Al-Hajj, The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria
(Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, Ahmadu Bello University, 1973), 194-
99; Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 171-75; Dusgate, Conquest, 242-
249; Tibenderana, Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu, 164-72; Tukur,
British Colonial Domination, 283-330.
11. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906.
12. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906.
13. Lugard to Onslow, 28 February 1906. For a contemporary
account of the reasons behind the British fiasco, see Charles
Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria (London, 1911), 173-74.
Also see Dusgate, Conquest, 242-49; Adeleye, "Mahdist
Triumph," 200-14; Mohammad, Social Interpretation of Satiru.
14. Lugard to Onslow, 21 February, Cd. 3620.
15. Times (London), February 21, 22, 23, 26, March 6, 1906.
16. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906, Cd. 3620.
17. Burdon to Lugard, telegram, 28 February 1906, Shillingford
Papers, Rhodes House.
18. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906, Shillingford Papers.
19. Malam Bako to Malam Ja'faru of Argungu, February 1906;
manuscript in the Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna and
quoted here as cited in Muhammad Al-Hajj, The Mahdist
Traditin in Northern Nigeria (Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, Ahmadu
Bello University, 1973), 199.
20. See the account of H. A. S. Johnston, "Dan Makafo and
the Satiru Rising," in Johnston, ed., A Selection of Hausa
Stories (Oxford, 1966), 166. Johnston compiled this story from
a number of sources. The portion about the trial is attributed
to Malam Nagwamatse, whose father was present.
21. Burdon to Lugard, telegram, 22 March 1906.
22. Burdon to Lugard, telegram, 12 March 1906.
_
37
23. For Mahdist resistance in northern Adamawa, we are
relying on Ahmadou Bassoro and Eldridge Mohammadou, Histoire
de Garoua. Cite Peule du XIXe siecle (Yaounde, 1977), 53-60,
275-77.
24. Bassoro and Mohammadou, Histoire de Garoua; also see
Kurt Strumpell, "Der Mahdische Auf stand in Nord-Kamerun,"
Kolonial Zeitung, 1908; "Die Mahdi Austande in Kamerun,"
Globus, 93 (1908), 210-11; A. Herfurth, "Unruhen in -.
Nordkamerun," Kolonial Zeitung, 1907, 324.
25. See the synopsis of a letter from Zubeiru, emir of Yola,
in H. F. Backwell, ed. and trans., The Occupation of Hausaland,
1900-1904, Being a Translation of Arabic Letters found in the
House of the Wazir of Sokoto, Bohari, in 1903 (Lagos, 1927),
75.
26. Bassoro and Mohammadou, Histoire du Garoua; M. S. Njeuma,
Fulani Hegemony in Yola (Old Adamawa), 1809-1912 (1978). On Arabu's
association with Hayatu, see C. N. Ubah, "British Measures against
Mahdism at Dubulwa in Northern Nigeria, 1923: A Case of Colonial
Overreaction," Islamic Culture, 50, 3 (1976), 171. For his
identification with Maroua, see Martin Z. Njeuma, "Adamawa and
Mahdism: the Career of Hayatu ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898,"
Journal of African History, 12, 1 (1971), 72.
27. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy; "Mahdist Triumph," 193-99; "Rabin
b. Fadlallah and the Diplomacy of European Imperial Invasion in the
Central Sudan, 1893-1902," Journal of the Historical Society of
Nigeria, 5,3 (1970), 399-418; Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition; Al-Hajj,
"The Thirteenth Century in Muslim Eschatology: Mahdist Expectations
in the Sokoto Caliphate," Research Bulletin, Centre of Arabic
Documentation (Ibadan), 3, 2 (1967); Saburi Biobaku and Muhammad Al-
Hajj, "The Sudanese Mahdiyya and the Niger-Chad Region," in I. M.
Lewis, ed., Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966), 425-39; Umar Al-
Naqar, The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa (Khartoum, 1972);
Murray Last, "Administration and Discontent in Northern Nigeria,"
Africa, 1970, 351-52; and Mark R. Duffield, Hausa and Fulani
Settlement and the Development of Capitalism in Sudan: with Special
Reference to Maiurno, Blue Nile Province (Ph.D. thesis, unpublished,
University of Birmingham, 1978), 9-32.
38
28. Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya(" 427-28.
29. As cited in Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya,"
427.
30. Infag al-maysur, as quoted in Biobaku and AI-Hajj,
"Sudanese Mahdiyya," 428.
31. Muhammad Bello, as cited in 'Abd al-Qadir b. Gidado, Majmu al-
rasa'il, and quoted in Martin Z. Njeuma, "Adamawa and Mahdism: The
Career of Hayatu ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898," Journal of African
History, 12, 1 (1971), 63.
32. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition, 90.
33. Al-Hajj (Mahdist Tradition, 82) gives the year as 1811,
but in Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya," 428, the year
is given as 1813.
34. Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya," 429.
35. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition, 169-70.
36. Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya;" Al-Hajj, Mahdist
Tradition; Al-Naqar, Pilgrimage Tradition; Duffield, Hausa and
Fulani Settlement; and Njeuma, "Adamawa and Mahdism," 63-64.
37. footnote for Abdullahi's emigration — need a source.
38. Biobaku and Al-Hajj, "Sudanese Mahdiyya," 429.
39. Last, "Administration and Dissent," 351.
40. Njeuma, Fulani Hegemony. 182-86; Njeuma, "Adamawa and Mahdism,"
64-77.
41. Njeuma, "Adamawa and Mahdism," 61-77. Note that full
citation belongs in an earlier fn.
42. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition.
39
43. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition; Biobaku and Al-Hajj,
"Sudanese Mahdiyya," , 13th century of Muslim era and
Mahdi.
44. John Lavers, "Jibril Gaini: A Preliminary Account of a
Mahdist Leader in North-Eastern Nigeria," Research Bulletin of
the Centre of Arabic Documentation (Ibadan), 3,1 (1967), 20fn;
Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition, 95-96.
45. Njeuma, Fulani Hegemony, 186-87.
46. Njeuma, Fulani Hegemony, 189.
47. Njeuma, Fulani Hegemony, 185-201; Adeleye, "Rabin," 415-
18.
48. R. A. Adeleye, "Rabin Fadlallah, 1879-1893: Exploits and
Political Relations in Central Sudan," Journal of the Historical
Society of Nigeria, 5, 2 (1970), 231.
49. Adeleye, "Rabin Fadlallah, 1879-1893," 236-41; Adeleye, "Rabih
and European Imperial Invasion," 402-18.
50. Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition, 169-70.
51. Lavers, "Jibril Gaini," 20-34.
52. Lavers, "Jibril Gaini," 23.
53. Lavers, "Jibril Gaini," 32-34.
54. On the second battle of Bormi, see Al-Hajj, Mahdist
Tradition, 166-69;
55. fort built at Biraa Hill, see
56. Njeuma, "Adamawa and Mahdism," 72.
57. R. A. Adeleye, '"The Dilemma of the Waziri: The Place of the
Risalat al-Wazir 'ila ahl.al-'ilm wa'1-tadabbur in the History of the
Sokoto Caliphate," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 4, 2
(1968), 285-311.
40
58. Njeuma, Fulani Hegemony, 201.
59. On the Emir of Gwandu's Mahdist sympathies, see Tukur,
Colonial Domination, 233, 283-95; and Tibenderana, Sokoto,
Gwandu and Argungu, 162-63, 169-70. Mahdist sympathies were
widespread among the aristocracy at the time of the conquest;
see the translation of Arabic letters referring to the Mahdi
which were written in the last few years of the independent
caliphate in Backwell, Occupation of Haualand. The letter of a
royal slave of Sarkin Kudu (emir of Yola) Zubeiru to the Sarkin
Musulmi, which was written at the time of the British conquest
of Yola pledges allegience "to you by Allah and the Prophet
and after you to the Imam Mahdi" (p. 67-68). Zubeiru fled
Yola upon the British conquest on 2 September 1901 and
informed the Sarkin Musulmi that Imam Mahdi, who was widely
recognised as the successor of Jibril Gaini as a representative
of the ansar movement, commanded his attention (p. 74-75).
Muhammadu Alhaji, brother of the emir of Missau, was also a
Mahdist and joined Attahiru (letter to Sarkin Musulmi, p. 77).
60. Cargill report; Lugard, Annual Report; Tukur, Colonial
Domination.
61. A. Burdon, Report No. 2, Sokoto Province, April 30, 1903,
Sokprof 2/1 23/1903, Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna
(hereafter NNAK).
62. Al-Naqar, Pilgrimage Tradition, 89.
63. David Robinson, "The Umarian Emigration of the Late
Nineteenth Century," International Journal of African Historical
Studies. 20, 2 (1987), 245-70; Gaden, "Note sur les Toucouleurs
recemment arrives a Fort-Lamy," 19G2, 10 August 1906 (We
wish to thank David Robinson for this reference).
64. Gaden, "Note sur les Toucouleurs."
65. Tibenderana, Sokoto, Gwandu and Argungu, 162-63, 169-
70; Tukur, Colonial Domination, 233, 283-95.
66. Burdon To Lugard, 26 May 1906, Shillingford Papers;
Lugard, Annual Report. 1905-06, 371.
41
67. On the extent of accomodation with colonial rule, see Adeleye,
"Dilemma of the Waziri," 285-98; Bassoro and Mohammadou, Histoire du
Garoua. and Idrissa, Guerres et Societes. . It should be noted,
however, that a number of scholars argue that accommodation was much
less sincere than might be suggested by the accusation, and no value
judgement on the degree to which the aristocracy cooperated is
intended here; see Tukur, Colonial Domination.
68. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-06. , provides a ••
convenient summary of these pledges of support. Additional
evidence is scattered in the archives; see especially
69. For the importance of local military levies in the German
and French spheres, see Idrissa, Guerres et societes, ; and
Bossoro and Mohammadou, Histoire du Garoua.
70. We have benefitted from the interpretation of Asmau G.
Saeed, who has identified three groups of Mahdists, viz., the
ansar or devotees of the Mahdi of the Nilotic Sudan,
"spontaneous Mahdism" or "those who followed self-styled
Mahdists" like the leaders of Satiru, and "revisionist Mahdists"
who awaited the coming of the Mahdi but did not emigrate or
emigrated only reluctantly but did not revolt and who generally
represented the official view of the aristocracy; see her
"British Fears over Mahdism in Northern Nigeria: A Look at
Bormi 1903, Satiru 1906 and Bubulwa 1923," unpublished paper
presented at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
London, 1986 and "The British Policy Towards the Mahdiyya in
Northern Nigeria: The Study of the Arrest, Detention and
Deportation of Shaykh Sa'id b. Hayat, 1923-1959," Kano Studies.
2, 3 (1982-85), 95-119. Our interpretation differs from Saeed's
in several important respects, although we agree in recognizing
three major divisions within Mahdism. We concur with her
analysis of the ansar, but suggest that the "revisionist
Mahdists" could be forced into action, as Attahiru was during
his hi.jra, and as is clear from our analysis, those Mahdists
whom Saeed considers to have acted "spontaneously" were in
fact "revolutionary" in their intent, planning, and actions.
Furthermore, our analysis differs in that we demonstrate that
Mahdists in the ansar tradition could approach a position which
was close to being revolutionary, although further research
should be conducted on this important implication of our study.
_
42
The revolutionary possibilities of Mahdisra, particularly with
reference to Satiru, have been accurately identified by
Abubakar Sokoto Mohammad (Social Interpretation).
71. For a discussion of the Hamza and the Ningawa resistance, see
Adell Patton, Jr., The Ningi Chiefdom and the African Frontier:
Mountaineers and Resistance to the Sokoto Caliphate (Ph.D. thesis,
unpublished, University of Wisconsin, 1975); Patton, "Ningi Raids and
Slavery in the Nineteenth-Century Sokoto Caliphate," Slavery and
Abolition, 2 (1981), 114-45; and Ian Linden, "Between Two Religions
of the Book: The Children of the Israelites (c. 1846-c.1920)," in
Elizabeth Isichei, ed., Varieties of Christian Experience in Nigeria
(London, 1982), 79-98; and Lindin, "The Isawa Mallams, c. 1850-1919:
Some Problems in the Religious History of Northern Nigeria," seminar
paper, unpublished, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University,
1975.
72. Church Missionary Intelligencer, 8, 1884, 594; also see
J. Schon, Magana Hausa, 161-62.
73. "The Prophet Jesus meeting with a skull to which he
restored the power of speech," in Schon, Magana Hausa. 162-
63.
74, Lovejoy, "Problem of Slave Control," 263.
75. It should be noted that the location of Satiru has been
the object of some confusion. Various sources have placed the
village haphazardly; see, for example, Robert W. Shenton, The
Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria (Toronto, 1986),
27.
76. This important point should be credited to Abubakar
Sokoto Mohammad, Social Interpretations, in which it is argued
that the Satiru uprising derived from class struggle, an
interpretation which Idrissa (Guerres et Societes) accepts at
least in part. The argument here attempts to flesh out this
earlier analysis.
77. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 161-65.
78. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 171.
43
79. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 183-84; Mohammad,
"Songs and Poems of the Satiru Revolt," (check first reference);
Burdon to Lugard, 21 March 1906.
80. For a general discussion of early colonial Mahdism, see
Al-Hajj, Mahdist Tradition; Lugard, Annual Reports, 1905-06,
; Tukur, Colonial Domination, ; Mervyn Hiskett, The
Development of Islam in West Africa (London, 1984),
Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph," ; Idrissa, Guerres et Societes. ;
Saeed, "British Fears;" and G. J. F. Tomlinson and C. J.
Lethem, History of Islamic Propaganda in Nigeria (London,
1927).
81. Quoted in Hiskett, Islam in West Africa, 272.
82. E. C. M. Dupigny, Gazetteer of Nupe Province (London,
1920), 25.
83. There is some discrepency over the events surrounding
Satiru in 1904. Mohammad (Social Interpretation, 159) claims
that Maihafo declared himself Mahdi in January* apparently
relying on E. J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Sokoto Caliphate (London,
1920), 45. Arnett is wrong on a number of points relating to
Satiru, however, and it may be, as other sources suggest, that
Maihafo only asserted his claim in February; see
84. "Labarin Farkon Gabar Satirawa," in Frank Edgar, ed.,
Litafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa (Edinburgh, 1913), III, 404.
85. Orr, Sokoto Province Report No. 1, February 29, 1904,
Sokprof 2/2 51/1904 (NNAK).
86. Lugard's marginal note on Orr's Sokoto Report No. 1.
87. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906, CO 446/53; and
Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-06, 369.
88. Scholars have assumed wrongly that Isa become the leader
at Satiru upon the death of his father in early 1903 (see, for
example, Dusgate, Conquest. 242), but Burdon's report of 21
March 1906 clarifies the situation.
44
89. See Johnston's account, "Dan Makafo and the Satirawa,"
163-65.
90. Burdon to Lugard, 21 March 1906.
91. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 148-49.
92. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 174, citing Robert Arnaud,
Keport No. 4, 11G4, Archives Nationales, Paris; Ponty,
"Extract."
93. Ponty, "Extract."
94. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-6), 367; Adeleye, Power and
Diplomacy, 322.
95. Hiskett, Islam in West Africa, 272.
96. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph,11 211.
97. Burdon to Lugard, telegram, 22 March 1906.
98. Mohammad, "Songs and Poems of the Satiru Revolt."
99. Lugard to Elgin [date not stated], CO 446/52, cited in B.
de Houghton, Militant Islam and British Attitudes Towards Islam
in Northern Nigeria, 1896-1923 (M.A. dissertation, unpublished,
University of Birmingham, 1967), 31.
100. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph," 196, citing Lugard to Elgin, 9
May 1906; also see Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-06. 366; and
Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy. 322.
101. Also known as Alhaji Muhammad; see Al-Hajj, Mahdist
Tradition, 197-201.
102. Report of 28 February, as cited in Adeleye, "Mahdist
Triumph," 196. Howard heard the prophecy late, or he took his
time in reporting it, or local Mahdists jumbled the instructions
that the uprising would begin at the Id el-Kabir, 5 February.
Otherwise, the prediction of the Mahdi's appearance "in a
month" does not make sense, in which case Howard's report is
46
117. Abubakar Sokoto Mohammad, "The Songs and Poems of the Satiru
Revolt, c. 1894-1906," seminar paper, unpublished, Department of
Sociology, Ahmadu Bello University, 1985.
118. For a discussion of the terminology of Caliphate slave estates,
see Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Characteristics of Plantations in the
Sokoto Caliphate (Islamic West Africa)," American Historical Review
119. Burdon to Lugard, 15 March 1906.
120. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 173.
121. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 175-79.
122. Besides the colonial documentation, there are several
contemporary accounts of the Satiru revolt, and Idrissa and Mohammad
have collected oral traditions. The contemporary, indigenous
accounts include "Asalin Gabar Satiru," in Edgar, ed., Litafi na
Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa, I, 263-69, 431; and "Labarin Farkon Gabar
Satirawa." To these should be added the poems and songs collected by
Mohammad ("Songs and Poems of the Satiru Rising") and the compilation
of Johnston, "Dan Makafo and the Satirawa."
123. Mohammad relies on oral material to a much greater
extent than any other scholar. .
124. Burdon to Lugard, 21 February 1906, CO 446/53.
125. Conference of 28 February 1906, No. 11115, CO 446/52.
126. Lugard to CO., 7 March 1906, CO 446/53.
127. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 171.
128. Cited in Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 171, and based
on an interview by Dr. Saleh Abubakar, 14 August 1975.
129. Idrissa, Guerres et Societes, 146.
130. See Paul E. Lovejoy, "Fugitive Slaves: Resistance to
Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate," in G. Okihiro, ed., In
Resistance: Studies in African, Afro-American and Caribbean
47
History (Amherst, Mass., 1986); J. S. Hogendorn and Paul E.
Lovejoy, "The Reform of Slavery in Early Colonial Northern
Nigeria," in Suzanne Miers and Richard Roberts, eds., The End
of Slavery in Africa (Madison, 1988) .
131. Lovejoy, "Fugitive Slaves;" Hogendorn and Lovejoy,
"Reform of Slavery."
132. Ibrahim Tahir has provided the best analysis of the
composition of the class structure of Caliphate society; see his
thesis.
133. Burdon to Lugard, 15 March 1906, Shillingford Papers.
134. Mohammad, Social Interpretation, 164.
135. Dusgate, Conquest, 247.
136. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph," 200.
137. Margery Perham, Lugard. The Years of Authority, 1898-
1912 (London, 1960), 259-60.
138. Wallace to Lugard, 31 October 1907; Lugard (son) to
FDL, 7 October 1907.
139. Lugard to Strachey, 9 April 1908; Lugard to Miller, 9
April 1908.
140. Minute initialled WSC to Conference of 14 March 1906,
No. 13475, CO 446/53, PRO. Churchill was Undersecretary of
State for the Colonies.
141. Perham, Years of Authority, 260.
142. Lugard to Lady Lugard, 9 March 1906, Perham Papers,
File 2.
143. Lugard to Lady Lugard, 13 March 1906, Perham Papers,
File 2.
144. Conference of 28 February 1906, No. 11115, CO 446/52.
48
145. Adeleye, "Mahdist Triumph," 211.
146. Hogendorn and Lovejoyi "The Development and Execution
of Frederick Lugard's Policies toward Slavery in Northern
Nigeria," forthcoming.
147. Lugard to CO, telegram, 14 February 1906, CO 446/52.
148. CO 446/52, p. 567.
149. The implications of the Satiru revolt on the development
of slavery policies is explored in Hogendorn and Love joy,
"Lugard's Slavery Policies," but will be examined in greater
detail elsewhere.
150. P. M. Dwyer, Report No. 59 for July-September 1911,
Ilorin Province, Ilorprof 2086/1911. We wish to thank Ann
O'Hear and Stefan Reichmuch for this reference.
151. Saeed, "British Policy towards Mahdiyya," 95-119; and
Ubah, "British Measures," 169-83.
